CONTENTS

		PAGE
FAR-EASTERN AXIS		
WHY JAPAN BACKED OUT	*"Oriental Affairs," Shanghai*	55
CHINA'S CAVE SCHOOLS	*"North China Herald," Shanghai*	57
JAPAN TURNS SOUTH	*Air - Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, "Far Eastern Service," London* ..	58
ODDMENTS	.. ..	60
CORRESPONDENCE		
CALL A REAL CONFERENCE !	*H. St. J. B. Philby*	61
INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF	*Reviews by Jan Masaryk, A.W. Lawrence, Douglas Reed, Stuart Emeny, Sir Roger Chance, John Marks, Aylmer Vallance*	65
THE WORLD OF FINANCE		
TRADE, TOTALITARIAN AND OTHERWISE	*"Rapier"*	76
DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS	*H. H. Wade*	77

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WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

CAN BRITAIN WIN A PEACE?

by VERNON BARTLETT

THE British lion was recently described by an American newspaper as "the Lion of least resistance." In so far as the Lion is represented by the present British Government this criticism is most unfair. The resistance shown by Mr. Chamberlain to the only possible policy which can get the British Empire out of its present difficulties, namely an alliance with Russia, has been as stubborn as that of the proverbial mule.

For this stubbornness there are, I think, two reasons. The one is the dislike of anything to do with Communism. The number of excuses that have been issued and circulated by Conservatives during the last few weeks for the failure to reach an agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is quite fantastic. Their prejudice and distrust have closed their ears to the fairly obvious argument that only a war could produce Communism in our country, and an impatient French diplomat summed up their attitude well when he remarked that we and the Russians were behaving like two people who were in the greatest danger, but who would not talk over the methods of getting out of the danger because they had never been properly introduced. That sense of class which induced hundreds upon thousands of upper-middle-class Englishmen to support General Franco despite all the evidence they had of his close connection with Germany and Italy has become very obvious again during recent weeks, and one begins to realise why our Left-wingers are so convinced that Mr. Chamberlain is at heart a Fascist.

"Appeasement" Still Lives

But quite apart from this prejudice against Russia because Russians are, or are alleged to be, Communists, there was another reason for delay. Mr. Chamberlain was, I believe, convinced that once he signed along the dotted line with M. Stalin it would be much more difficult for him to discuss peace with Germany should Germany show any desire for peace. "Appeasement" is not dead, which is a pity. The hope of lasting peace is not dead, which is a blessing. Sooner or later Germany may want to discuss upon level terms, and it is important that there should be no obstacles in the way. For the time being, however, it is vastly more important that an Anglo-Russo-French treaty of mutual assistance should help to bring about those conditions in which peace discussions would be possible.

Hitler Slows Down

I, for one, see no reason for war. Germany hitherto has made rapid progress towards European hegemony because she has been able to take great risks. The rearmament of other powers and the fear which is helping to bring them together combines to make those risks inadvisable. But that may only mean that Herr Hitler will work more slowly. Despite the tremendous hardships that his people have to face and the undoubted fact that the workers are beginning to display their discontent by sabotage, there is no particular reason to believe that Nazi Germany cannot get its own way.

The Trade Stranglehold

There is now a sufficiently well-organised "peace front" to make conquest dangerous. But in most cases conquest is of very little use to the Nazis. It is far better for them that Denmark, for example, should be outside their economic system, but so tied up by commercial treaties, signed under the threat of invasion, that the Danes work as much for the Germans as for themselves. There is no prejudice against buying Danish goods in the democratic States as there is against buying goods from Germany. The Poles, the Yugoslavs, the Hungarians and others, accustomed to a low standard of life, may yet be induced to work for Germany in much the same relationship as the African negro works for the Englishman or the Frenchman. One can indeed envisage a German Empire covering the greater part of the European continent. Only those very few countries that have not been driven by exchange difficulties into barter agreements with her will keep their entire independence. A British Government which has to argue at length with Sir John Simon before £100,000 or so can be given by way of credit to some small European State is no competent competitor against a Germany whose economy is planned to the last detail.

Hitler, Apostle of Peace?

Hitler, indeed, is in a much stronger position than is generally believed. Germany still has lean years ahead of her, but after all, each time the food situation becomes so bad that the people begin to threaten, the Government can always begin to cut down its import of materials for guns and give them butter again. The smaller countries that would willingly retain their complete independence, but cannot do so because the countries which could afford to give them credits have so little interest in their fate, will have to plan their production to meet Germany's needs, and having done so will be less able than ever to break away again from the German orbit. It is difficult to believe that a nation trained to fight, as the German

nation has been trained during the last few years, will be able to cut down in armaments without war. But there is a great difference between what is difficult and what is possible. If I am right in my forecast, the time may come when the Fuehrer will convert himself into an apostle of peace, and will gain great prestige and power for Germany by so doing.

Into Reverse

During the last few weeks, for the first time for many months, one has heard people talking about avoiding war and not merely postponing it. But the great obstacle in the way of its avoidance is that nobody can see how to put the war machine into reverse gear. Germany, I believe, could do so more easily than the democratic States. The Fuehrer has but to utter his order and vast numbers of soldiers are immediately transferred to the construction of roads or civic buildings or model dwellings for workers. For the German, unlike the Englishman, has already learnt the great truth that the wealth of a nation depends not upon the amount of gold stored in the vaults of its national bank, but upon the brains and muscles of its people. Even in Great Britain we vote week after week in the House of Commons fresh expenditure which a year or two ago would have horrified our "sound money" experts. The time may soon come when the interest on our national debt will exceed our total national income. And when we have time to concentrate upon something else but the preparation for war we shall find ourselves faced with a social struggle at least as grave as any that is likely to happen in the totalitarian States.

Peace Conference Prospects

Try for a moment to picture the outcome of a successful international peace conference. Once Hitler accepts the idea of such a conference the other statesmen will be very conciliatory, because they could not so easily face the prospect of a breakdown as could Hitler, who has less to lose. Their people are not so ready to be spoon-fed by propaganda ministries and to accept the argument that they are driven to war by the intransigence of their opponents. A breakdown in negotiations would quite probably unite the German people, but divide the democracies, for the economic or colonial concessions demanded of them would not weigh equally on them all. And if negotiations succeeded the Germans would have the moral comfort of printing new maps with new colonial territories and the material comfort of consolidating their economic gains in eastern and north-eastern Europe. They could then turn to the business of transferring the national production from warlike purposes to constructive ones.

But we in Great Britain would have our struggle before us. One of the most important precautions against war, namely the provision of great arterial roads out of London, has hardly been tackled at all, because of the number of private interests that have to be satisfied before a house can be pulled down or a road can be widened. The very liberties of the individual which we so treasure might easily, in the stress of disarmament, rob us of all liberty. There is the possibility of a clash of class interests so bitter that it will call forth qualities of leadership far greater than those needed in the preparation for war. And, heaven knows, those qualities are lacking to-day.

One can foresee a struggle far more severe than any we have known since the last war between those who hope to set the national finances right by capital levies and those who seek to do so by cutting

down social services. And all the cleverness of our ruling class, the moderation of our workers, may not enable us to reach a solution of that struggle without bloodshed.

Dangers to Come

This is not written with a view to depress the reader or to do a little Nazi propaganda on the quiet. My object is rather to point out the danger of talking as though the abolition of the immediate danger of war would at once lead to a solution of all our difficulties. It may be that in face of that danger we are more or less unconsciously making decisions that will lessen social struggles. It is scarcely credible, for example, that we shall ever again believe the old doctrines of money. It is much more difficult for us than for Germany to spend vast sums for which there are no corresponding gold reserves, since Germany, through force of circumstances, has developed much more of a closed economy than we have done. But the man in the street is never going to believe that unlimited money can be spent upon the preparation for war, but cannot be spent upon better education and better social services.

We should not—we dare not—forget that war between nations and rivalries between classes are merely the horizontal or vertical threads in the same pattern. One cannot be dealt with to the exclusion of the other, and the more ready we are to achieve harmony in our social life the more chance there will be of avoiding war. There are constant stresses and strains as mankind seeks to achieve a larger measure of wealth, health and security. If the strain becomes too great, solution is sought in war. But in peace as in war each system of government is being put to the test. The merit in dictatorships is obedience; in democracies, reason. And although it is quite true that the German people are discontented, let us not make the all-too-easy error of imagining that there is no discontent in our own country. For it is not so certain as some people imagine that even if Great Britain can avoid the threatened war she will also win the longed-for peace.

FOREIGN BALANCES

by DOUGLAS REED

WHAT a month was May, 1939! During it, the great four-handed poker game that began on January 30th, 1933, when Hitler became German Chancellor, reached its climax. The players are ourselves, France, Germany and Italy, everything is in the pool, the joker is Russia, and the player who holds the joker will win.

Perhaps before this article appears the show-down will have come. Mr. Chamberlain, whose Policy of Abasement —sorry, I continue to make that slip— has reached another of its inevitable milestones with the German-Italian victory march-past in Madrid and the consummation of the full German-Italian military alliance for all eventualities, is being pushed by the inexorable logic of events to make a British alliance with Russia. He does not want to. He looks like the man who does not know which is worse—the illness or the medicine, and he quails before that red-tinted draught.

Even now, with Germany and Italy in that watertight military alliance, which already provides for a unified command and a fair division of labour on land and sea in case of war, he "deprecates" the "formation of *blocs*," a phrase which, if it means anything, can only mean that those threatened by the predatory dictatorships should refrain from provoking them by wickedly defending themselves.

He hints, once more, at new appeasements and placations; he alludes, again, to the just grievances of two States which already, by the threat of violence, have become greater than they ever were before; he speaks, though he does not specify, of a mysterious wall that intervenes between Britain and Russia and which cannot be penetrated.

Who Built That Wall?

If that wall exists, it has not been built by Russia. The Russians know who built it and that is the explanation for their chronic state of suspicion to-day. I remember a talk I had four years ago, just before I left to report Anthony Eden's visit to Moscow, with a certain influential man who was neither a member of the British Government nor held any official post, but whose opinions about foreign policy, formed in that ignorance which is bliss, have in the event been followed in all major British actions—in Spain, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Albania—until the present day.

His opinion at that time was that Germany should be left her "free hand in the East." He, who knew neither Germany nor Russia, thought that by this means National Socialist Germany and Soviet Russia would eventually become embroiled and the West would be able to bask in the sunshine of neutrality while they fought it out. The course he advocated was the exact opposite of that which the British Government officially proclaimed to be its own and which Eden was supposed to co-ordinate with the Russians in Moscow. But the Russians were, and have ever since been, perfectly well informed of the existence and power of this school of thought in Britain, and that is the reason for the unyielding all-

or-nothing attitude they have taken this May. They know now that they are in a strong position, and that Britain has more to lose than Russia. They hold the master card—the withdrawal of Russia into isolation and benevolent neutrality towards Germany, which would give Hitler his "free hand in the West." The dismissal of Litvinoff and the cancellation of Potemkin's journey to Geneva to meet Lord Halifax are the clear warnings of what would happen if Britain this time were to let Russia slip through her fingers.

With Russia, Hope

Such is the pass to which these years of muddled thinking, of placation-politics pursued by men who did not know the things they were dealing in, have brought us. But we are luckier than we deserve. As I write, it still seems possible that we can get that alliance with Russia. If we do, the equilibrium of forces in Europe—for this is not a matter of Reds or Browns, of private property or Communism, but of men, guns, tanks, ships and aeroplanes—will be so nicely adjusted that we may yet save the peace. A war would be so incalculable a risk for the dictators that they might yet recoil from one and decide to take what face-saving concessions they could get at an armed conference. But even if that hope failed—and the stick-at-nothing men are in the ascendant in Italy and Germany at present—we should still have a good hope of victory in war.

Without Russia, we have neither the hope of peace nor that of victory. The inevitable bill for all mistakes of the last six years has now been presented.

Hitler Wooing Stalin?

Gloomy though the picture is that Europe now presents, that gigantic game of poker is fascinating to watch. All men, outside the shores of this incredibly remote island, know that our guarantees to Poland, Turkey, Rumania and Greece are mythical—without Russia. Without Russia, they are the upper floors of a house that has no foundations. Few people could read the signs, which became clear a few months after Munich, that Hitler was already trying to reach an arrangement with Russia, to intercept that Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance which in the end would be fatal to him. The first sign was the absence of provocative references to Russia in his speeches. The second was the sudden cessation of German activities in the Carpathian Ukraine, which clearly meant that the "Great Ukrainian" adventure, with its inevitable connotation of enmity towards Russia, had been abandoned or shelved. The next sign came from Moscow—the dismissal of Litvinoff. Once the Soviet Government begins to eliminate the Jews from the administration, it begins to offer Hitler the possibility to tell his people "Russia is no longer Bolshevist; the Bolshevist element is being eradicated."

Small Nations Wait and Watch

The small countries, which have monopolised our attention for so long, are for the moment out of the game. They have sat on the fence for so long that, as Mr. Lloyd George once said of Sir John Simon, the iron has entered into their souls. The masses in all of them are overwhelmingly for Britain and France against Germany and Italy, but the masses have nothing to say. They all know that their fate, too, will be decided with the outcome of the discussions between London and Moscow.

Tactics Against Poland

At this moment the German tactics with which the world became familiar in the cases of Austria, the Sudetenland, Slovakia, and Bohemia-Moravia, are being applied against Poland. The heat is being turned on. There has been the usual attack on a small and isolated Polish customs post by large numbers of surrounding Germans, exasperated beyond endurance.

It is just conceivable that Danzig might be incorporated in the Reich without Poland's disappearing entirely, although the loss of the Polish position in that city would be a most serious matter for that country; if I remember rightly, Poland has no direct railway line to her only port, Gdynia, as all lines go through Danzig.

If the Corridor Went

But that would be, beyond question, the last success that could be allowed to the dictatorships without a complete landslide of all the small countries into their laps. If the Polish Corridor goes, Poland herself will ultimately disappear as completely and inevitably as Czecho-Slovakia. If that happens, there will be no further months of anxious waiting on the part of the other small States. They would throw up the sponge, one and all. They would scuttle to seek the only hope of safety remaining to them—safety under the wing of the Reich.

And that would happen so quickly that disaster would be upon Britain and France before they had time to draw breath. All these things turn on the Anglo-Russian negotiations.

If these negotiations are further delayed and protracted, two countries to watch for the direction of the wind are Poland and Yugoslavia.

Prince Regent Paul

Yugoslavia is perhaps the most interesting of all. That country is in a desperate jamb. She is split internally by the Serb-Croat quarrel, and she is surrounded by beloved enemies on all sides. The masses are overwhelmingly hostile to both the dictatorships. The king is a schoolboy. The ruler of the country is Prince Regent Paul, and a great deal turns on him.

Prince Paul is practically unknown to the Yugoslav masses, and very few of the people have ever seen him. If you drive out from Belgrade you will suddenly find yourself passing an enormous estate, walled and wired and hedged, with barracks full of troops within it, and policemen lurking behind almost every bush on the wayside. In the remote centre of this green retreat, which is as strongly guarded as the Kremlin itself, is Prince Paul's palace.

Prince Paul has an obsession about Communists, which has led him to complain to distinguished visitors from England about almost every British journalist who ever tried to do a job in Yugoslavia, and these innocents abroad have often lent willing ear to quite baseless complaints and conveyed them back to newspaper lords and editors in London. Prince Paul's feelings seem to derive largely from pre-war aristocratic family connections in Russia.

Calling on the Axis

Prince Paul, who is Oxford-educated, was in England during the Great War, when his cousin, the soldier-king Alexander, who was murdered in 1934 at Marseilles, was leading the Serb Army. He did not spend much time in Yugoslavia before he became Regent, under Alexander's will. That is why he is little known to the Yugoslavs.

The part played by Italy in harbouring the assassins of Alexander is a matter of proven historical record. In May Prince Paul was an honoured guest in Rome. In June he is to be an honoured guest in Berlin. Only those who know him intimately can say precisely what his private inclinations are; but the implication of his public actions is fairly obvious. He is, however, in opposition to the Yugoslav masses in this matter. He cannot lead the Yugoslavs into alliance with Germany and Italy. Whether he can array the State of Yugoslavia, in which the masses cannot at present make their voice heard, with the Axis Powers depends entirely on the development of the Anglo-Russian negotiations and on whether people abroad in coming weeks come to believe that Britain and France now really mean to stop aggression or not. If they do not receive that impression, Yugoslavia will inevitably join up with Rome-Berlin. If they do, nothing can make the Yugoslavs tolerate such a move.

Final Show-down

The final show-down is at hand. This trial of strength and nerves and resolution behind the scenes may still drag on for days, for weeks, or possibly even for a month or two. But then, the future of Europe will be decided.

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

ALL DOORS HAVE BEEN LEFT OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION.

"Haagsche Post," The Hague

"Nebelspalter" Switzerland

THE FAKIR



THE JUGOSLAVS' TURN

"Now, are you in the Axis or are you not?"

"Le Canard Enchaîné"

THE OPEN FORUM

SPAIN'S PLACE IN EUROPE
A Retrospect and Forecast

by MANUEL AZAÑA

In this section we print articles by men of international fame, without necessarily sharing the views they express. We have a particularly interesting contributor this month in the man who was President of the Spanish Republic until the tragic last days before it fell to General Franco. This is Señor Azaña's first public utterance since his retirement

SOME three years ago, a leading Spanish diplomatist said to me: "There is a great deal of talk about our foreign policy. But what need have we of any foreign policy?" Pursuing a personal train of thought, this distinguished diplomat had arrived at a conclusion similar to the opinion held by the majority of his countrymen. Wiser and sadder for her adventurous past, Spain, they almost all agreed, should now stand aside from European conflicts and look to her own internal reconstruction.

At the root of this opinion, though not everyone was aware of it, there throbbed a wounded point of national pride. With a great history behind him, yet conscious of present weakness—a weakness borne home to the people, as a painful surprise, by the colonial campaigns and the war against the United States at the close of the last century—the Spaniard resigned himself with an ill grace to playing a secondary rôle. Apparently his motto was: Cæsar or nothing. That opinion of the average Spaniard is still further reinforced by his feeling that Spain in the past was treated with cruel injustice by her rivals for European predominance. Whether justified or no, this feeling is kept alive by education and training in certain classes of Spanish society.

This attitude of aloofness, half scornful and half angry, took definite shape after the débâcles of 1898. At that time, too, Spain considered herself abandoned by Great Britain and France in the face of America's

overwhelming power of aggression. The truth of the matter is that Spain then reaped not only the fruit of self-deception (her people were led to believe that the naval strength of the United States was a mockery) but also the reward of her voluntary isolation. Possessed of a colonial empire, she not only lacked a fleet but had failed to provide herself with any form of diplomatic alliance that might conceivably have served to guarantee her safety.

Strictly speaking, Spain's active participation in European affairs ceased with the Napoleonic wars. The circumstances and outcome of that struggle had left a scar of deep and bitter resentment on the Spanish soul. The French Empire had subjected Spain to a wanton and brutal invasion. The frightful war which followed plunged the country into poverty and chaos for half a century. Later, in 1823, legitimist France intervened in Spain to restore despotism. During a hundred years, Spanish liberalism, indignant at Chateaubriand's policy, and Spanish patriotism, incensed at the memory of Napoleon's outrages, combined to foster and maintain the anti-French significance of the Second of May celebrations commemorating Madrid's uprising against Murat. Not until 1908, when a Franco-Spanish exhibition was opened at Saragossa—actually on the occasion of the war's centenary—did the Spanish Government decide to suppress the national character of the holiday, and to give it instead a purely local flavour. This was at the time of the Entente Cordiale and the Moroccan agreements. Spain's grievances against the French seemed forgotten. Everyone acknowledged that Napoleonic expansion was not an essential aim of French external policy.

Attitude Towards England

Where England is concerned, Spanish popular intuition regards her as a bad enemy. Dating from the wars of Charles III and Charles IV against England, and the destruction of Spain's sea-power at Trafalgar, we have the phrase: "War with all the world, but peace with England." British military intervention in the Peninsular War against Bonaparte was, as everyone knows, of decisive importance. Yet, although it was asked for from the start by the organisers of Spanish resistance, Britain's help by no means quelled the patriotic Spaniards' antipathy towards her. Relations between Wellington's army and the Spanish Government and people were very far from amicable and easy. Then, too, England's support of the Spanish-American colonies in the cause of independence

certainly did not make for a better understanding between the two countries. The Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal had little positive result, though it signified closer contact between the four governments. Palmerston favoured the loyalist constitutional party under Isabel II. He was popular in Spain as a result. Torn by a ferocious civil war, penniless, without ships, disunited at home, without prestige abroad, Spain seemed to be on the verge of forfeiting her independence. The British and French representatives at the Court in Madrid competed for control over the Government and interfered in Spanish politics as in the affairs of a protectorate. Through the breach caused by civil war, foreign authority, one way or another, inevitably enters. We have seen this happen again, to a far more serious extent, in the case of the war that has just finished. Yet they had hardly established a comparative peace before Spanish Governments of the nineteenth century embarked, for reasons of prestige and thinking to continue a national tradition, on fresh adventures overseas. The Rome expedition of 1849, the African war of 1860, the landing in Mexico and San Domingo: all ended in sheer disaster or in profitless waste of money and lives.

Neutrality at Any Price

The spirit of the Spanish nation sank to its lowest pitch of despair at the dawn of the twentieth century. Eminent Spaniards believed that Spain's separate existence and historical identity had come to an end. The philosopher Joaquín Costa proclaimed his plan for a national renascence, clamouring "Lock the tomb of the Cid, relock it, and lock it again!" (i.e. let us put a stop to the policy of foreign risks and entanglements, to heroic pride and defiance), calling for "Food and schools!" (i.e. feed the people and educate them). Costa did not invent these formulas so much as translate them from the unspoken language of the hour. They had immense popular success. Political programmes of that period echoed his sentiments. And although Costa, while smacking of the reolutionary, was himself really deeply conservative and a lover of tradition, nevertheless his teachings were particularly well-received and taken up by the parties of the Left. In terms of foreign policy, padlocking the Cid's tomb meant: neutrality at any price. On this, for once, all Spaniards could agree. Since the very word neutrality implies abstention, to the common man it seemed that the absolute minimum

of foreign relations was wanted. Yet, even so, it is essential that neutrality should be deliberate and able to defend itself—and that belligerents should respect it. Spain's isolationist policy was based on the belief that her almost insular position was an advantage towards this end. That theory is, on the whole, mistaken. For it to hold good, certain circumstances would have to apply which do not, in every case, depend upon the will of the Spanish Government and people.

THE INDIAN TOMB

"It is England's aim to prevent any attempt to dominate the world by force."—Mr. Chamberlain.



"Kladderadatsch," Berlin

Actually what made Spain's neutral attitude possible—and moreover made it easy—was the Franco-British Entente. While Britain and France were still rivals, in the event of a clash Spain's position of neutrality would have become so extremely difficult as to be untenable, since between them these two powers dominate her every coast and frontier (Portugal is England's ally) and control all her lines of communication. Once France and Britain had, with mutual advantage, ceased to compete, Spain's outward horizon immediately cleared, and was sure to remain untroubled *so long as no rival, no new competitor, were to loom up on the Mediterranean skyline.* As soon as that competitor appeared, Spain's place in the world was endangered, her attitude over the last thirty years, and the reasons for adopting that attitude, were very rudely shaken.

The Moroccan "Living Space"

Neutral or not, Spain could not fail to interest herself in the Moroccan problem, which, if it had brought about a war, would certainly have put an end to our neutrality. The Spaniards had no desire to go into Morocco, and even less wish to fight there. Reasons of State, strategic considerations, a sense of historical continuity, as well as the prospect of certain economic advantages, together carried the day. If there was to be a distribution of territory and zones of protection in Morocco, Spain could not afford to take no notice. She might have claimed that Northern Morocco was a necessary "living space," if the phrase had been fashionable at the time. A first proposed plan for the division of the land, prior to the Treaty of Algeçiras, allotted Spain a much larger share of the Moorish empire than her present protectorate. A Spanish statesman rejoiced then—in my opinion quite rightly—because this original scheme was never carried out. The portion that was awarded to Spain by the Convention of 1912 disappointed the hopes of the Government and of that part of public opinion which looked upon the Moroccan venture as a question of prestige. The hybrid solution that was given to the problem of Tangier was a blow to their pride, and they felt defrauded by the parsimonious delimitation of the Spanish Zone: neither of these envious resentments have shown any signs of abating to this day.

The visit of Edward VII to Cartagena, and various other indications that Spain had entered the Franco-British orbit, did not prevent

her from remaining neutral during the War. She was able to do so because Italy finally threw in her lot with the Allies. It would have been a different matter if the Western Mediterranean had become the scene of fighting. But though the Spanish State took no side, its citizens most emphatically did. Spain was split in two violently opposite camps. It was like a civil war, all but the shooting. This proves that the conflict mattered more to the Spaniards than was generally supposed. And it was not on the ultimate fate of Alsace-Lorraine or of Poland that their interest was so passionately centred, but on the foregone consequences which the triumph of one or other group of adversaries would have for Spain herself. There is no doubt that the vast majority of both these Spanish factions knew little about why the war was being fought. Their ignorance is excusable. Did a large number of the combatants themselves know much more? True, there were many Spaniards—especially among the intelligentsia—whose motives were disinterested, who espoused the cause which appealed to them as the more just and more in keeping with the future of a liberal European civilisation. But there were many more who followed other impulses. If the foreign policy of a nation is a reflection of its internal policy, it seems natural that each Spanish group should ardently have hoped (and, in so far as they were able, have striven) for the victory of those who might lend the future policy of Spain their active support or at least their invaluable example.

The War-Time Pro-Germans

The pro-German party consisted of: the Army (France was its ancient enemy; it admired Prussian discipline and efficiency), the Church (hostile to France on account of her anti-clerical legislation and expulsion of the religious orders), a large section of the middle class (antagonistic towards French republicanism), all the Carlists, a good number of conservative royalists (admittedly not including some of their leaders). There were a few other exceptions: certain members of the nobility, for personal reasons of kinship or upbringing, were pro-Ally. So were the Catholic priests who had been influenced by Louvain, and the small minority of professional soldiers whose liberal tendencies were stronger than their army background.

The anti-German *bloc* was made up of republicans, almost all the liberal monarchists, the leading personalities in the Socialist Party, which was then not large, and the great mass of the people. Both groups were

fully aware that a German victory would be sure to give encouragement and possibly even direct aid to an inner political upheaval which should re-establish a reactionary régime in Spain. So, from the Spanish point of view, some joyfully looked forward to such an outcome, while others dreaded it. The pro-German party had the further, negative satisfaction of believing that now, thanks to the War, the time had come when England and, more particularly, France were to suffer in return for all the insults and the wrongs which they had heaped on Spain throughout the past. She was being avenged by another's hand. I offer no judgment on either attitude. I merely record them.

A Vassal of "Mittel-Europa"

Both groups were generally in favour of neutrality—but the pro-Germans took this line chiefly because it was quite obvious that Spain could not under any circumstances join in with Germany. Even so, the leader of the Carlist party openly advised the severance of relations with the Allies, in order to take back Gibraltar and one or two other places. German propaganda informed public opinion, and even suggested to Government circles, that if Spain went to war on their side the Kaiser would give her Gibraltar, Tangier, a larger slice of Morocco and a free hand in Portugal. In other words, a Spanish Empire stretching from the Atlas to the Pyrenees—or, as Unamuno sarcastically described it, "the Iberian sub-Empire," by which he implied that it would be simply a vassal state under the vast Empire of *Mittel-Europa.* None of these things came to pass. So, like all fantastic political projects that are not fulfilled, for a time this notion seemed futile and absurd. It is far less fanciful than it looks. Since then, all the Spanish objectives have been finally occupied. Whoever compares the rhythm of Spain's internal politics, from 1923 to the present day, with the development of the international situation as a whole, will observe how that division into two groups which I have drawn regularly reasserts itself, unaltered, and what its effect has been. Now, with Italo-German aid, the old pro-German party has achieved by war in Spain what in 1914-1918 it dreamed of getting out of a German victory. That for various motives certain persons or groups who during the Great War were pro-Ally are now among the supporters of the new order in Spain makes no difference, since their influence on her destinies appears, at any rate for the present, to amount to very little.

When the League of Nations was called into being, it seemed to offer a permanent guarantee of peace for Spain. The system of collective security would shield her from outside attack, without any need for her to take risks abroad or to build up a powerful military machine at home. The League of Nations was looked upon by the pro-German group in Spain with dislike or derision.

Where Spain Would Stand in a European War

The failure of collective security, the impotence of the League, and the causes of this decline, together with the appearance of an ambitious Italy in the Mediterranean, presents Spain with the urgent problem of her neutrality in the case of war or, alternatively, the awkward choice of which side to back.

If the decision lay with the people themselves, their almost unanimous cry would be: Peace at all costs! No doubt some would assert or advocate the opposite view; but they would not be many. The arguments for Spanish neutrality still hold good, rendered all the more compelling by the havoc of the recent war. The country's need and longing for tranquillity must be more acute than ever. No head of state could be unconscious of that fact. Nor can Spain's rulers fail to realise how exceedingly dangerous it would be for a newly implanted régime to find itself not only involved overnight in a war against powerful neighbours but, by reason of its very nature and of the methods that gave it birth, actually responsible for a war which, from the outset, could not prove other than hideously destructive and altogether disastrous for Spain, because of her geographical position. Such, in my view, are the considerations that militate in favour of Spain's refusal to engage in a European conflict. They are weighty; but there are no others.

I shall not refer to the factors in the opposite scale of the balance, as I should have to rely on conjecture to do so. But what can be examined, because this we know, is the principle by which each type of Spanish opinion has sought to orientate the nation's foreign policy in time of peace. It would be erroneous to attribute Spain's problematical attitude in the event of a European war purely and simply to the presence of foreign troops in the Peninsula, the enhanced prestige which its successes may have won for the Reich, or the natural consequence of civil strife and its aftermath. All this plays its part, but it is not the whole problem. Nothing could be more misleading than to imagine that all was impro-

vised on the spur of the moment. Even German-Italian intervention itself, if we consider it strictly in the light of the Spanish scene, denotes the existence of a definite and settled body of opinion, whose formation I have already analysed. It would be foolish to try to assess the number of its adherents, but we can safely say that recent events have not tended to reduce it, and that never before has it wielded so strong an official influence. Its tenets may be summed up as follows:

Spain, a country with a civilising and imperial mission, was robbed of her rightful pre-eminence by a conspiracy of unscrupulous rivals moved by mercenary greed and heretical hatred.

The possible aggrandizement of Spain, and, above all, her will to greatness, must inevitably challenge the power of France. It is in the French interest to keep Spain weak, harmless, and submissive. This is equally to the advantage of England, who prefers to see the Peninsula divided into two separate States—so that Spain is handicapped—and who holds on to Gibraltar, which, if she could wrest it back and thus gain full control of the Straits, would give Spain an incomparable strategic position.

No Quarrel with Germany

With the German Empire, Spain has never had any serious quarrel. On the contrary, from 1521 to 1712 both countries shared a common policy; and when, with the peace treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, wellnigh a hundred years of Spanish ascendancy in Europe came to an end, it was a triumphant France who crowed over the Spanish crown and the German eagle.

Therefore, since Spanish and German interests do not clash at any point and both countries have a common need of protection from the selfsame foes, it follows that the one way and condition of making Spain great is to revive her traditional foreign policy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

German diplomacy and propaganda are not obliged to invent any of this. Many Spaniards have already accepted it in advance.

Arrayed against these theories are those views which we may gather collectively under one head and call the opinion of the Spanish liberals. In the development of Western European civilisation, Spain has her appointed place. Without loss to her individual genius, she forms part of a system which is determined not only by geographical and economic

circumstances but also by its spiritual values. In her political growth Spain has followed the evolution of the Western democracies. Her true national aims are all capable of fulfilment within her own borders, and the first requisite for their attainment is peace. Since the eighteenth century, Spain has never enjoyed twenty consecutive years of peace. She is comparatively poor, and although her population has doubled in little over a century, she is still sparsely inhabited. The province of Badajoz, for example, equal in size to the whole of Belgium, has fourteen inhabitants to the square kilometre. Her mineral wealth is poorly exploited, her popular education neglected, millions of her labourers go hungry—the just and sensible course is to build up this race anew, and strengthen it. Even were the imperialist theories practicable, they would require a colossal military and economic effort, which would preclude attending to this first task of reconstruction. And what need or chance of expansion is there for a nation that has not yet managed to people or cultivate its own land? Spain's neutrality, based on friendly agreement with Britain and France, her biggest neighbours and her best clients, constituted a fundamental principle for those who held this belief. That Spain should not be a strongly armed power was, up to 1935, one of the pivotal foundations of the Mediterranean balance. There is a widespread conviction that this most important truth has not been sufficiently realised. It was a policy that had long prevailed in Spain, not only under the Republic, but before, under the ministers of the monarchy. Sticking to it, as a loyal member of the League, Spain embarked on the policy of sanctions. The last believers in the League of Nations were Spaniards. One knows now with what result.

It would be ridiculous to suppose that all the Spaniards who used to profess these views have discarded them. But the effect of their wholehearted application to the international relationships of the Spanish State has disappeared with the destruction of the Republic.

FREE TOURS FOR THE FAMOUS

Leopold Stokowski, world famous conductor, Pearl S. Buck, the authoress of *The Good Earth,* Margaret Mitchell, the authoress of *Gone With The Wind,* Shirley Temple, Hollywood starlet, and world-famous persons in religious, sport and newspaper fields will be invited to Japan for sight-seeing by the Board of Tourist Industry next year.—*"Japan Chronicle," Kobe.*

THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET

PARTIAL BRITISH CONSCRIPTION

Valet Daladier: "You aren't quite ready yet, sir."

"Marianne" *Paris*

"You just see, Tunis will become Italian."
"It's about time some place did, now that Italy has become German."

"Haagsche Post," The Hague

"Le Canard Enchainé"

"With the help of the Soviets it'll be strange if we don't knock out the Bolsheviks."

"Le Canard Enchainé"

". . . And the proof that the Americans want to please us is that they have married Annabella."

THE UNWANTED
Plea for the Political Refugee

by MAX BARTH

His own experiences as a State-made "criminal" led the writer to make this plea for special consideration for the active political refugee who continues to work from outside for the overthrow of the Government which made him a fugitive. The writer is himself, he states, neither a Jew nor now a Communist. "In fact," he says, "I can scarcely be called Marxist any longer"

NOW and again a gang is unmasked, especially in France, who have been making a good living out of faking passports. The fakers, if caught, are punished severely. But although I absolutely agree that punishment is right and just, I myself should not hesitate to make use of one of those fakers' products if I was sure of two things: that the forged passport was not that of a man wanted by the authorities (I prefer to be "unwanted" rather than "wanted"), and that the forgery was done so well as not to be found out: and if I had the money to pay the price for it, which, for really good passports, is exorbitantly high.

Why should I be ready to buy a forged legitimation paper? The answer is quite simple: I am a German political refugee, and therefore liable to be treated by the authorities of any foreign country as any criminal is treated. They may declare me to be "unwanted," they may put me in jail, they may steal my belongings, if they take their fancy, they may take me to the frontier and make me go into the neighbour's land, clandestinely. They even *did* all these things to me. So, instead of being registered as a refugee, and being deprived of some of the elementary human rights, especially that of freedom to go where I want, I should make use of a false passport without the least remorse in order to live and travel unmolested, always having the authorities on my side.

The situation is very plain. Every country in the world has legal instruments enabling it to manage "undesirables." These instruments are meant to protect the country against foreigners who offend against its laws, or lack means of existence (with which their own country, if they are sent back to it, must legally provide them), or make themselves a nuisance in any other way. It is quite right that an injured country should have means of ridding herself of undesirables, but I think it

unfair to apply those means to refugees without their having done anything to injure the country in which they have sought refuge. If there is reasonable danger of being overrun by refugees, other ways of dealing with them should be found. It is, of course, much simpler to apply the existing ordinances against the "unwanted." So the authorities take any man they want to deal with—he may have been, in his own country, anything from a workman to a professor—and shove him over the frontier into a neighbouring land, thus forcing him to begin his career there by violating the law in entering without passport and visa. They treat him as a law-breaker, and force him to become one.

The Farce of the Spanish Visa

There are other absurdities, too. In 1934, when I intended to go to Spain from France, the Spanish consulate in Paris asked me to produce a recommendation by the German ambassador in France! What they suggested was, in fact, that a man who had fled his own country to save his life from persecution by its authorities and semi-official bands of murderers, and who was subsequently sought by that country's police on a charge of high treason, should go to the official representatives of the same country and beg them kindly to recommend him. When I told them that this was impossible, they suggested I should bring, instead, a recommendation from the Jewish committee for refugees. No recommendation, no visa—in spite of my having been accepted by France as a refugee. I went to the Jewish committee and after long argument succeeded in getting a letter from them, although I am not a Jew. At last I got to Spain, but my visa was not obtained legally at all; for I presented to the consulate my old German passport, which had expired a year before. They had it in their hands twice, and seemed never to doubt its validity, for they gave me the visa. Although it was, technically, *their* error, I had violated the law and was liable to punishment. But I had no choice. I wanted to go to Spain, and, as a refugee, I must seize every chance that presents itself.

I stayed in Spain little more than a year. Then, in August, 1935, I was expelled. It was not my fault. In autumn, 1934, Gil Robles succeeded for the first time in getting some of his men into the cabinet. The people answered the formation of the new government (presided over by Señor Alejandro Lerroux) by revolting. They were beaten by the Moors and the ill-famed Foreign Legionaries. Then, reaction set to work. One of

the characteristics of that counter-revolutionary epoch was the closing by the clerics and the authorities of public libraries, the State lay-schools, the workers' meeting-houses and educational centres.

One of the measures taken by the reactionary Lerroux government was the systematic expulsion of "undesirables." No discrimination was made between tramps, thieves, and refugees. A German professor, a botanist if I remember rightly, escaped the fate of being put on board a German ship only by the repeated intervention of a Catalan member of the Cortes—a Rightist. He was lucky enough to be only expelled by stealth to France. I was arrested for deportation. The reason given was activity in the service of the Communist Party. But I had been expelled from the German Party as far back as December, 1933, when I lived in Paris, and felt not in the least like going back or doing anything for them. Of course, the accusation was no more than a pretext. They did not even worry to arrange a sham inquiry. I knew the German consulate did not want me there, and Spain being ruled by a "nationalist" government, the



"L'Oeuvre" *"Marianne," Paris*

HITLER'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS

"I know when there will be much more joy."
"When?"
"On his next fiftieth anniversary."

"With these rumours of attempted assassinations, I thought it wiser to play the rôle of the little girl with the bouquet myself."

4

consulate was omnipotent. The Spanish authorities just had to do what they were told. They arrested me under the *ley de vagos y maleantes,* though I certainly was not a *vago* nor a *maleant.* But they used to apply this law in all cases when and where they had a grudge against somebody but no legal means of satisfying it.

I had to wait in jail for a fortnight, until the papers for my expulsion were signed by the minister in Madrid and sent back to Barcelona. They took my fingerprints half-a-dozen times, photographed me looking quite dangerous with half-a-week's beard, measured me, and so on.

One of the visitors who came to see me in prison told me that a certain prominent member of a certain Spanish political group would procure a passport for me, possibly a French one. I did not know the man, and to my knowledge never set eyes on him, and I never was in touch with his group, nor did I share its doctrine. But they had heard about my arrest, and being genuine anti-Fascists, they thought this a case where solidarity must step in, and so did not hesitate to offer me their help. I at once agreed. I was told that after being expelled to France I should have to go to a certain French town, and there to a certain address (which I should receive some days later), and wait for the passport. Unfortunately, my friendly helper was arrested two days later, for political reasons, and when I was expelled, he was in jail himself. So I did not get the new passport and new identity, which I should gladly have accepted without scruple.

On the Run

In the middle of August the police took me to Puigcerdá, there led me to a brook running parallel to the frontier, and told me to cross it into France. I did so. As my goal was Prague, I had to steal over some more frontiers: from France to Switzerland, then to Austria, and eventually to Czecho-Slovakia. I lived in Toulouse, Paris, Strasburg, Basle, Zürich and Vienna for days, always without a permit and without informing the authorities of my presence. When I arrived in Prague, I had to lie (pretending I had fled directly from Germany) in order to be accepted. There is a kind of unwritten law: stay in the country you fled to originally. That is: as a refugee, don't have any funny ideas of seeing other countries, or so forth. At all events, from the moment the Spanish police put me on the Way to Crime, meaning the way from Puigcerdá into France, I had to keep to it, cheating frontier guards and police, until

I could legalise my sojourn elsewhere—as I could in Prague. On my way from Spain to Czecho-Slovakia I had, of course, violated a dozen or more laws in different countries. Most of them were trifling, to be sure, but only in the eyes of sensible men, not in those of the law.

It would be very easy to turn anarchist through seeing the way States treat decent people along the same lines as tramps (who, besides, are often enough quite as decent as non-tramps) and criminals. Sometimes I have a real yearning to put the representatives of some States on a black list of "unwanted," and am sorry that I have no power to send them tramping around, hiding and looking for some helpful soul to give them a tip how to elude controls or cross frontiers. It would do them good.

Crocodile Tears of Democratic Governments

The so-called democracies boast loudly of their solidarity with us, poor victims of fascist persecution. No eye stays dry when their representatives make their heartfelt speeches. We are side by side with them, and they are side by side with us, brethren in the battle against oppression, barbarism and what-not. That's the theory. When it comes to practice, they know pretty well how to deal with us: they stamp us "undesirable," and the problem is solved. At least, theirs. Not ours. Of course, there was a time when governments gave false but genuine passports to Masaryk. Perhaps they will give us, or at least some of us, papers under a fancy name, too—when another war comes. But we don't want fake passports, however legalised by ministers; we should prefer to be given now, in peace time, some legitimation in our own name, entitling us to enjoy that fundamental human right, the freedom of movement.

I fully recognise the difficulties that arise for the refuge countries, but I should like *them* to appreciate *ours* too. It is not only the humiliation of being a man without rights and the limitation of free movement (for instance, it took me eight months until I had all permits and papers for my journey from Prague to Oslo, and I should have been able to manage the whole thing in two or three weeks if I had travelled clandestinely). It is more than that. There is a somewhat sinister aspect to the whole problem.

When, in October, 1938, Messrs. Chamberlain and Bonnet, International House for Selling Out What's Left of Europe, agreed to give Hitler a free hand in south-eastern Europe, they agreed implicitly to his

occupation of Czecho-Slovakia. There could never be any doubt of this. It was quite certain that sooner or later German troops would march through the Václavské Námesti and Hitler would air his rudimentary moustache in the windows of the Hradschin. Mr. Chamberlain's indignation, later, was quite inadequate, because it was either ridiculous or false. He had agreed beforehand, and if he did not know that he had—well, that may explain a good deal.

The Tragedy in Prague

There were living in Prague thousands of German and Austrian refugees. They were fully aware of the fact that they were trapped as soon as Hitler came. Had they had some kind of passport enabling them to move as freely as other people (decent or not), they would have left at once. But they had to wait for their turn to come and they sat and waited, and calculated whether they would get a chance or not, whether Hitler would be first or the visa for England, U.S.A., France, Sweden, Norway. For a good contingent of them Hitler came first. What became, or will become of them, nobody knows at this date. You see, it was the enlightened practice of the democracies to rescue first the Sudeten Germans who had fled to the interior of Bohemia. There were, I understand, an average of two to five Germans from Czecho-Slovakia in every group of fifty refugees. Now, the Sudeten Germans, to be sure, had to flee from their homes too, and they risked persecution, too. A great many of them had to expect imprisonment, concentration camp, and ill-treatment with perhaps, in some cases, fatal results. But, apart from their leaders, their risk was far smaller than that of the former Reich Germans who had fled from their country because they were already suffering persecution. They had been active members of political parties; some of them had been imprisoned in Germany, some had endured the concentration camp. They had lived in Prague for years, co-operating with the Czechs, especially with the democratic, socialist or communist circles. They were anti-fascists, and they acted like anti-fascists. They were, to Nazi eyes, plainly traitors, co-operating with the enemy. They were in immediate danger of their lives. They should have been saved with the very first contingents. But the helpful democratic countries let great numbers of them wait for the arrival of their executioners. The selection of those to be rescued was, to say the least, very strange. There were even dozens of Sudeten Germans who returned from the countries that had

accepted them and given them refuge. They returned to their land, ready to live under Hitler's rule, just because they could not get accustomed to the foreign cuisine. This proves the frivolity in selecting those to be rescued. Evidently among those given precedence there were people who had so little to fear from the Nazis, that they preferred living in Hitler's Bohemia where they could get their plum-dumplings to living in safety and eating things they did not like, or did not know. For each of those who returned, one politically valuable German or Austrian who was waiting for his rescue may have to suffer severely for years, or even to die.

I think it is highly necessary to recognise *two different categories* of refugees. For there *are* two categories. There are those who want to emigrate *for good,* intent on founding a new home in another country, and there are others who emigrate only for the purpose of seeking shelter *temporarily,* always intent on working for Germany's freedom and on returning as soon as there is a chance to overthrow the Nazi régime. In the first class, the vast majority are Jews, but there are a good many Aryans among them. In the second you find the political type, Aryan

BRITISH CONSCRIPTION

"Please, sir, can I call fear conscientious objection?"

"I suppose so. But if I allowed it in every case, good-bye to our 200,000 men."

"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome

and Jew. The first group wants "to get away from it all." The second wants to keep close to the whole thing, if not always in space then at least in mind and activity. It is most impractical to treat both categories in the same way. The first are *emigrants* and at the same time immigrants. The second are *refugees*. They do not seek a home, but a temporary asylum. They want to be your guests like any other foreigner, and nothing more. They will leave in time.

I think, most countries would find it possible to deal with the *emigrants* generously, always bearing in mind that they are future citizens. And most countries, too, could find a *modus vivendi* as to their *refugees*. Of course, the latter would have to stand being subject not only to the usual control in order to preserve native wage-earners and tradesmen from their competition, but also to political supervision. As we have got accustomed to that in the last six years, I strongly suspect we could stand it. Moreover, a neat separation having been accomplished, I believe the authorities would quite soon see that they could grant us a little more liberty than they have so far. They could fix our "status" juridically, and give us some security against being treated as undesirables. They could even give us a passport. The choice of changing the category at will would, of course, remain. This would imply becoming subject to the other category's laws and rules and all the advantages and disadvantages connected with them.

I have spoken of the German (and Austrian and Sudeten-German) emigration only. But the same holds good for the Italians, Spaniards, Czechs and other emigrants that the near future may create if Messrs. Chamberlain and Bonnet insist on continuing their policy of furthering Hitler's advance towards the subduing of Europe's small nations.

LAMENT FOR A LOST FLAME-THROWER

The point where he (Hitler) pulled out all the stops and became the sublime tragedian was when he read the inventory of German military equipment destroyed after the World War. With mingled tenderness and wrath, he intoned the lost—59,000 guns and barrels, 130,000 machine guns, 6,007,000 rifles, 16,500,000 grenades, 60,400,000 rounds of live ammunition and so on. By the time he reached the 1,072 flame throwers, it was as the peroration of a funeral eulogy over a precious departed. Perhaps he didn't really sob, but he sounded much like the betrayed maiden of the melodrama about to totter out into the snowstorm.

In type, they are cold statistics. The Führer's tremolo made them a sacred cause, an affront to the great gods Moloch and Mars.—*"St. Louis Post-Dispatch," U.S.A.*

THE SPHINX OF THE KREMLIN

IN THE BALANCE

Many and varied were the statements about Stalin's foreign policy following Litvinoff's fall. It would undergo a complete reversal, said some; it would be the same, only more so, said others. Here we give a reasoned elucidation by a writer in one of the best-informed neutral journals of the Russian end of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations

by NIKOLAUS BASSECHES

From "Die Weltwoche," Zürich, 12.5.39

EVERYTHING was done to make Litvinoff's retirement sensational. There had been talk about his retiring for the last two years. But genuine dismissals are always carried out with extreme caution. Long after Tuchachevski was arrested, the fact was energetically denied; he continued to be regarded as the official representative of the Soviet Government at the coronation of the King of England, and at the last minute he had to ring up the British Ambassador from prison and excuse himself on the grounds that a cold prevented his making the trip. The

Ogpu chief, Yagoda, was first shifted to the inconspicuous office of Minister of Posts before he was finally finished off. And so it was in other cases. Tchitcherin remained officially People's Commissar for eighteen months after Litvinoff had in fact taken over from him.

Policy in the Soviet Union is decided on solely by the supreme head of the Party, and the persons filling the offices of the various departments only play a small part. But it is realised in the Kremlin that any change in the head of the Foreign Affairs department leads to far-reaching comment abroad, to a hitch in diplomatic relations, in a word, to difficulties and delays.

Litvinoff's retirement had, in fact, been prepared long in advance. A special decree gave his deputy, Potemkin, special powers. Then, in the middle of the most important negotiations with England, forty-eight hours before Colonel Beck's speech, his dismissal was completed. For dismissal it was. There is no such thing as a petition to retire in the Soviet Union, except for genuine health reasons, accompanied by a certificate from a Party doctor. A Communist has to fill a post just as long as the Party decides he is required.

A Warning to the West

Stalin had two years to look for a substitute for Litvinoff—and then was in such a hurry that he could not wait for the return of Potemkin, who was due home in a few days, but had temporarily to appoint Molotoff. Every move and every announcement has been made to underline the suddenness of the decision and its political significance. And there is only one explanation of this political demonstration—that it is a clear warning to the west, a cleverly chosen method of driving the Western Powers to a quick decision.

What preceded this demonstration? In his speech at the last Party Congress,* Stalin accused the West-European and American Press of having aimed at playing up the Ukrainian question since Munich, in order to create an atmosphere of irritation between Germany and Russia, and provoke a war between the two.

Then, on May 1st, at the parade in Red Square, War Commissar Voroshiloff, addressing the troops, said: "Our people can be calm; we shall not let ourselves be drawn into the adventures of Capitalist States."

On the other side, in all his last three speeches, not only the most recent, Hitler omitted his customary attacks on the Soviet Union.

* *Following this article we give extracts from this speech.*—EDITOR.

Now, as to the facts: they are one-sided. Following the September crisis, Germany brought off, by the Agreement of Vienna, the creation of an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, against Hungary, and, in the background, Poland. The Czech Government was obliged to re-name Carpatho-Russia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and to tolerate the formation of an independent Ukrainian army. At German instigation, Ukrainian Nationalists were brought to Chust from all parts of the earth. Large sums of money were invested there. The erection of a big Ukrainian university was planned; the nucleus of a large army was laid down. Everything was supervised by the new German consul.

Then—in March? In March, with, of course, German approval, Hungarian troops marched into Carpatho-Ukraine. First the Ukrainians drove the Czechs out by force, then they turned to defend themselves despairingly against the invading Hungarians—always, every minute, expecting German aid. The leader of the Ukrainian nationalist and terror organisation, and intimate friend of the Germans, Jora Revai,

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QUO VADIS,
BRITANNIA ?

"Kladderadatsch," Berlin

4

sat in Vienna and tried in vain to speak to Ribbentrop. Instead, he was put under house arrest.

The consequence of this betrayal is that throughout the world Ukrainians are filled with hatred of Hungary and are turning away from Germany. Many years' work has been destroyed in its essential features.

Germany was strong enough in March, as she was in September, to refuse the Hungarians Carpatho-Ukraine. The service rendered Hungary must, therefore, have had other grounds. It is closely connected with Stalin's speech, in which he ridiculed the assertion that Germany was aspiring to the Ukraine.

And then, only recently, came another event. In a note, the Soviet Union declared, without being contradicted, that the Baltic States belonged to its sphere of interest, and that it would not tolerate any renunciation by these States of their independence or sovereign rights. The German Press remained silent. The German diplomatic answer is unambiguous—the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and Latvia is announced, and the forthcoming conclusion of a similar agreement with Estonia.

These actions are one-sided, but clear. An attempt is being made by the Third Reich to convince the Soviet Union that it respects Russian interests and has no intention of attacking the Union.

Towards Neutrality

Does this indicate that a form of German-Russian collaboration may emerge? That would be going too far. For internal political reasons neither side can abandon its attitude of ideological enmity. But, while co-operation is not to be thought of, a correct attitude *is*. An assurance from Germany in exchange for the neutrality of the Soviet Union towards the Third Reich's actions in Central or Eastern Europe.

It is a fact that a powerful movement exists in leading circles of the Soviet Union, which energetically advocates complete neutrality, and demands that the Union, as a revolutionary and proletarian State, should withdraw from the quarrels of the capitalistic world. It is a mistake to believe that Moscow has given up Bolshevik and revolutionary ways of thought. These circles use arguments taken from classical Leninism in support of isolation. They recall that Lenin said that the quarrels among capitalist States were the best guarantee of the Soviet Union's safety; and that the increasing acuteness of inter-State and social differences

offered the best prospects for world revolution. They go further with their arguments. After Munich, they say, a completely new situation arose. A war for the independence of Czecho-Slovakia would have been a progressive, an anti-Fascist, war. To-day everything has changed. A war now would be an imperialist war. No anti-Fascist forces would be taking a leading part in this war of the democracies. Czecho-Slovak independence has gone, and can only be restored by revolutionary methods. The Popular Front in France is dead. And Chamberlain has never been an anti-Fascist.

The new war would be simply one for imperialist interests—for a re-distribution of territory, raw materials and markets. With such a war Russia should have nothing to do. Germany would in the course of time become too strong? That does not matter! These circles are convinced of the strength of the Soviet Union. They are also convinced that in any such anti-Bolshevik campaign of Hitler's the rest of the world would only give Red Russia little help—or none at all.

The Anti-Isolationists

There are opponents of this thesis in the Soviet Union. *They* say, the Union is a Great Power too, which must protect its national interests. A series of causes, such as its cultural isolation, complete economic autarchy, and the whole internal political development, have led to one diplomatic door after another being slammed in Russia's face. The revolutionary policy in Spain and the Popular Front policy in France have suffered shipwreck. The Soviet Union, they say, cannot allow itself to be isolated from Europe. And as culture, foreign trade and the Press can no longer serve as instruments of Soviet foreign policy, only one method remains—that of throwing the Red Army into the scales.

The democracies, they say, cannot be abandoned. True, Bolsheviks must not differentiate too much between capitalists and capitalists; but for years sympathy with the democracies and detestation of Fascism have been cultivated among the Russian masses. Isolation would not be understood by them. World revolutionary tendencies also would be dealt a severe blow by an isolationist policy. The proletariat and the forces of freedom throughout the world would regard it as help for Hitler and a betrayal of anti-Fascism.

Naturally, these circles argue, the Soviet Union can only enter the democratic *bloc* as an equal partner. The isolationists welcome the

refusal of Poland and Rumania to allow the passage of Red troops, because this offers the Soviet Union a way out, and would enable it to save its face and make an anti-Fascist gesture by taking part only with materials and arms, not with men. The adherents of an active foreign policy, however, demand a completely free hand for the Red troops, and the use of the entire forces of the Soviet, which would give the Union the leadership in the democratic *bloc*. "We won't stand dribbling out doses of help at the command of Poland and Rumania," they said, "only acting in accordance with the will of those States' General Staffs, sending our troops hither and thither as Colonel Beck and King Carol think fit. If they want our help, we must have command."

Now it is just these differences of opinion of the two groups over the practical steps to be taken that has led to their uniting, and to the dismissal of Litvinoff. "All right," said the isolationists, "if we are to take part in the *bloc,* then it must be as a Great Power."

And as means to this end the dismissal of Litvinoff was chosen. His dismissal means neither more nor less than that the democracies must either accept the Russian proposals, or Soviet foreign policy will take a radical change in course. The instrument, the man, has been changed. With a new instrument, a new policy can be carried out. The Jew Litvinoff has been changed for the Aryan Molotoff—a gesture which facilitates conversations with Berlin. But no final step has been taken. The die is not yet cast. But the democracies will have to use all their efforts to get it to fall on the right side.



IN THE PARK, 1939

"The Punch and Judy show? Follow the trench, turn to the left past the bomb shelter, along by the sandbags, and you will see it behind the gas-mask depot."

"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris

WHEN STALIN SPOKE

The Soviet Union and Imperialist War

From the speech of M. Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party

Although Stalin's speech at the Communist Party Congress in March was perhaps the most important of all his rare utterances, only a few disconnected sentences from it were reported in the Western European Press at the time. Since Litvinoff's dismissal the most contradictory theories have been based on these few sentences, but still no full report, to our knowledge, has even now been published by any non-Communist journal. No apology is, therefore, called for, we feel, in printing the following so long after the occasion

A NEW imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar and involving over 500,000,000 people. The map of Europe, Africa, and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. The entire post-war system, the so-called régime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further development of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began, which seized the United States first of all and then Britain, France, and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the one immediately preceding it.

This circumstance naturally led to an increase of unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from 30,000,000 in 1933 to 14,000,000 in 1937, has now again risen to 18,000,000 as a result of the new crisis.

The new crisis differs in many respects from the preceding one and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Secondly, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; at a time when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganising the immense China market and is rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economy on a war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose, and when all the other big capitalist Powers are beginning to reorganise themselves on a war footing.

This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal way out of the present crisis than it had during the preceding crisis.

Lastly, as distinct from the latter, the present crisis is not a general one, but so far it involves chiefly the economically powerful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war economic basis.

The Coming Crisis in the Fascist Countries

As regard the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy, who have already reorganised their economy on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of over-production, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis, the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the military fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must embark on the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already entered. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a one-sided, war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary

for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption.

Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations between the Powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy—all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the Powers.

The new economic crisis must lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These methods of struggle have long been recognised as inadequate. It is now a

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ENGLAND SERIOUSLY THREATENED

Numerous French officers, states this German paper, have arrived in England to train our recruits.



"Kladderadatsch," Berlin

question of a new re-devision of the world, of spheres of influence, and of colonies by military action.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor States, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive States, primarily Britain, France, and the United States, while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Democracies' Policy Exposed

How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive States? Of course not! Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic States are unquestionably stronger than the Fascist States, both economically and militarily.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these States to the aggressors?

It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive States were to go to war and the war were to assume a world-wide character. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperial world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly Britain and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality."

Formerly, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each coutry defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But, actually, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free reign to war and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work, not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a

war with China or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deep into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace" and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations they let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre of England's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hong Kong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying: "Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Egging On Germany Against the Soviet Union

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czecho-Slovakia to her fate, thereby violating all and every obligation; and then they began to lie vociferously in the Press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralisation of the Russian air force" and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march further East, promising them easy pickings and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this, too, looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French, and American Press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the Press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some 700,000, and not later than this

spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over 30,000,000, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait-jackets for them in our country. But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to talk seriously of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Just imagine. The gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother mine, how sorry I am for you. . . . Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any Fascist masters. Is that a way to live? . . . Looking at you, I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me. . . ."

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in blank on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther East, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the West and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czecho-Slovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to the nether regions.

Far be it from me to moralise on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery, and so on. It would be naïve to preach morals to people who recognise no human morality. Politics are politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit:—

(1) We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position and we shall adhere to this

position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

(2) We stand for peaceful, close, and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet State.

(3) We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

(4) We are not afraid of the threats of agressors and are ready to deal a double blow for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon:—

(1) Its growing economic, political, and cultural might;

(2) The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;

(3) The mutual friendship of the peoples of our country;

(4) Its Red Army and Red Navy;

(5) Its policy of peace;

(6) The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;

(7) The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:—

(1) To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;

(2) To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;

(3) To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;

(4) To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

HERR HITLER PONDERS OVER THIS MAP

[*World Review*

Europe in the 14th century—when the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation dominated the centre of the Continent, and the Order of the Teutonic Knights held sway far up the Baltic lands. In those days the Reich was split into innumerable small principalities; now it is united. That Germany's historical moment is at hand is a feeling strong among Herr Hitler's followers, who eagerly study such maps as this.

THE POLISH BARRIER

UNTRUSTWORTHY ALLIES

by FRIEDRICH HUSSONG

From the "Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger," 7.5.39

"Remember Czecho-Slovakia," urges this German publicist. All declarations to the contrary, the belief genuinely lingers in Nazi circles that, were the issue apparently confined to Danzig, Britain and France would permit another Munich. In any case, it is good tactics to try to frighten the Poles with the suggestion

THE Europe of the western democracies has been suddenly plunged into darkness by the Moscow short-circuit. . . . What, for heaven's sake, is Moscow up to, they are asking, terrified, in London and Paris. Wasn't Wallach-Finkelstein-Litvinoff our best-beloved? Wasn't Dimitroff our heart's delight? Where are they? Why are they. . . ? What does Comrade Stalin mean by it?

The far-reaching investigations made by the English and, still more, the French Press into the "Value of Moscow as Ally," into "Soviet Russia's Military Potential" must now be broken off for the time being, since it appears more uncertain than ever that the western democracies are going to have Moscow as an ally at all. For the moment, at any rate, they are completely out of step. London and Paris are anxiously listening in the dark to hear whether Stalin is going or coming.

The megalomaniacal outbursts of hate in the Polish Press, and irresponsible Polish agitators, are giving the French goose-flesh, and causing the English, according to the *Times'* confession, "serious surprise" —so much so that Colonel Beck thought it best to keep his distance from his wilder compatriots in his Sejm speech.

"Danzig Polish"—"East Prussia Polish"—"Silesia Polish"—"Breslau Polish"—although we are convinced that these delirious babblings express the wishes of Polish jingoism, we will only bother ourselves with them in so far as Colonel Beck himself took them up with his curious phrase about "the Free City of Danzig" which was "no invention of the Versailles Treaty, but a phenomenon which has been in existence for hundreds of years." Mr. Beck thinks that Danzig "owes not only its development, but its whole right of existence to the circumstance that it

lies at the mouth of Poland's only great river"; Poland stands, therefore, "firmly by the rights and interests of its maritime trade and its maritime policy in Danzig"; and as for the Corridor, the word "Corridor" was an "artificial invention"; the Corridor was an "ancient Polish province."

We regard Colonel Beck as being neither so stupid nor so ignorant (he has had too much German education for that) as to expect for a moment that a single one of these words of his would be taken seriously by serious people. If the Free City of Danzig was not one of the inventions of Versailles—and one of the stupidest and most unnatural at that—then we suppose Czecho-Slovakia was not either, and, in fact, nothing was invented at Versailles. The history-book according to which the Free State of Danzig, as Colonel Beck understands it, has existed for centuries, will have to be written by Colonel Beck himself.

That German Danzig owes its development and right to exist only to Poland is so grotesque as to be almost funny. That Poland "stands firmly by its maritime trade and maritime policy in Danzig" cannot be quite brought to accord with the fact that Poland has desperately grubbed out of the water a new port, Gdynia, in order to desert Danzig and so allow its development and right of existence to wither away.

That Germany has no intention of tolerating such a violation of German vital interests and God's will should have become obvious to Mr. Beck at the latest when he heard the Führer's speech.

Final Offer

Finally, as regards the Corridor, it is not the *word,* but the thing itself which is an artificial invention. If we understood the Führer aright —and Mr. Beck will have presumably understood him too—the proposal which he made for doing away with the worst of the unbearable consequences of this artificial invention, and which Poland has rejected, was made for once only.

The Polish Press and the outbursts in various quarters to which it has incited, have told us more than Mr. Beck in his speech, after terrified warnings from London and Paris, liked to admit. We shall bear all they say in mind; including the leading article of the Warsaw military journal *Polska Zbrojna,* which gaily rattles this sabre: "We are ready for any war, against anyone, even the strongest opponent. . . . Our bayonets will in future as in the past be an instrument of victory; we await this victory. . . ."

That sounds suspiciously like the articles in which the Prague Press assured its readers a year ago, morning, noon and night, that every Czech would prove himself to be a soldier of the Hussite Army, which was invincible on its own, and more invincible still with its allies, England, France and Moscow. In other ways, too, the policy of Beck's Poland bears a fatal resemblance to that of Benes' Czecho-Slovakia—a resemblance that, were we in the Poles' shoes, would cause us sleepless nights. We remember, too—and perhaps Europe remembers—that not so very long ago other states and statesmen, apart from Czecho-Slovakia and Mr. Benes, relied not altogether successfully on Anglo-French

"La Caravane" *Cairo*

Democracies: "Don't worry, we are behind you."
Small Nations: "Don't worry, we are in front of you."

encouragements, promises and guarantees. Must we say it? Schuschnigg. Must we say it? Haile Selassie.

* * * * *

London and Paris, horrified by the Polish Press's excesses, warned M. Beck before his speech not to be pushed too far by the newspapers; now, they are demonstratively applauding his wisdom, strength and moderation. We would just remind him that, for a year and a day, all those who have been blessed with such approval, as the wards of the western democracies, have died of it. It seemed to us as if M. Beck, too, were talking extra loudly, like a child in the dark, to keep up his courage.

For it is not only M. Beck who is in the dark. His "protectors" do not in the least know what's up in Europe. They are trying to guess the riddle of Sphinx Stalin. They would love to be able to read in the stars what the darkness of the Kremlin hides. They would love to kill a huge sheep and read out of its entrails that the Axis is weaker. And Mr. Chamberlain asks Mr. Atlee if he perhaps can tell him, with whom in Moscow one *can* discuss Soviet Russia. They would do better to read the *Daily Mail* which wrote: "It is well enough known, that the French would not plunge into a conflict over a Polish quarrel like this; the English people, as far as they are concerned, are of the same opinion."

That is a gleam of light in Western Europe's night. It might be a signpost for M. Beck, crying like a child in the dark that he won't have "peace at any price." Does he, with the still more loudly yelling English warmongers, want "war at any price"?

IF THE KHANS CAN . . . ?

The Khan of Kher and the Khan of Nawagai have ended the feud between their two factions on the North-West Frontier of India, and formally embraced each other in the presence of their tribal supporters, after having demolished certain fortified towers, the ownership of which was in dispute.—*"Times."*

CLARABELLE HITLER

At Garvagh Petty Sessions, Joseph Stewart, Carballintober, who was fined 5s. for allowing two cattle to wander on the public road, said they were cows of the Hitler breed, and although they had plenty of grass of their own preferred to graze elsewhere.—*"Northern Whig," Belfast.*

STARTLING THOUGHT

Fascist press says Italy is "ready for anything at any moment." Would that include readiness for peace?—*"Philadelphia Evening Bulletin."*

GERMAN "RIGHTS" EXPOSED

by HENRI GUERNUT

From "La Tribune des Nations," Paris, 11.5.39

"THE Corridor belongs exclusively to us," say the Germans. "The Corridor," reply the Poles, "belongs exclusively to us."

The Germans adduce three kinds of reasons: (1) historical; (2) geographical; (3) racial.

The historical argument. The past commands the present. The Corridor belonged to us for three centuries; it still belonged to us when the Versailles Treaty reft it from us by force. Force does not override right.

The geographical argument. The Corridor is the natural passage between two German lands (East and West Prussia); in consequence it should become German land. A nation cannot be cut in two with impunity. East Prussia cannot live without the Corridor. To rob her of the Corridor is to condemn her to death. Necessity creates right.

The racial argument. A race has the right to possess the soil in which it lives. The Corridor is peopled with Germans in the majority; there are more Germans than Poles, more Germans than Kashubs, more Germans than the mixed or doubtful elements; therefore the Corridor ought to be German.

Let us now examine these arguments:

The historical right. I know none. What has been does not justify what is. That which exists does not imply the right to exist. If there *were* an historical right, it would be the right of force to perpetuate its domination; and that is a right which conscience denies. A thousand years of occupation by force do not authorise a single further minute.

If there were an historical right, it would not work in Germany's favour. Germany has occupied the Corridor twice: first, at the time of the Knights of the Teutonic Order, from 1308 to 1454, i.e. 146 years; second, from the partition of Poland up to the Treaty of Versailles, from 1772 to 1920, i.e. 148 years; total, 294 years.

Poland has occupied the Corridor twice: first, from 997 to 1308, i.e. 311 years; second, from 1454 to 1772, i.e. 318 years; total, 629 years.

If there were an historical right between two disputing peoples, the choice would have to fall on the one who came first. The first was Poland in 997.

The Poles were dislodged from the Corridor by force by the Teutonic Knights in 1308 and by Prussia in 1772. Now, force does not justify right.

We have got that clear, then. There is no historical right. And if there were it would declare that the Corridor belongs to Poland. The first German argument is therefore set aside.

The Geographical Argument

The same holds good for the second, the geographical, argument.

There is no geographical necessity, for nothing is necessary to anybody. A passage between the two parts of a State is a convenience. It is not a right; otherwise a mother country, with colonies at some distance, might claim the countries in between.

In the case in point, it is not impossible to communicate between East and West Prussia. It is possible to communicate by sea. I agree it is a longer journey. But the shortest route from one point to another in the same State does not belong to that State by right. M. Smogorzewski, in a book which I have before me,* points out the existence of at least twelve corridors and four semi-corridors in the world. Now there are not twelve or sixteen corridor problems; there is only one which causes dispute, i.e. the Polish Corridor.

In any case, if there *were* a law of geographical necessity, Poland would have just as much right as Germany to claim its authority. It is necessary, she would say, in order to import and export goods, for a state to have access to the sea. In fact, twelve tons of merchandise enters Poland every day for each kilometre of her land frontier; 360 tons enter for each kilometre of her sea frontier. In the name of geographical right, Poland claims the Vistula, and, therefore, the Corridor crossed by the Vistula.

And so the second German argument is no more valid than the first. The same goes for the third.

There is no racial right, because there is no race, only a mixture of races. There is no racial right because one race might inhabit several countries; and it would presumably then have a reason to annex them one by one. There is no racial right because one country may be inhabited by several races: which race should take that country? Racial right is a joke.

* *"Poland's Access to the Sea," by Vladimir Smogorzewski, Allen and Unwin, 16s.*

To sum up, if there *were* a racial right, Poland would benefit by it. In fact there are many more Poles than Germans in the Corridor. Here are the statistics of 1921: 757,801 Poles against 175,771 Germans. You will say that these figures are Polish, therefore suspect. But German statistics give much the same proportion. In no district of the Polish republic are the Germans in majority.

In order to make their own race appear more numerous, the Germans distinguish the Kashubs from the Poles. But in reality the Kashubs *are* Poles: they speak a Polish dialect which all Poles understand, while the Germans do not. Before the war they always sent, without exception, Polish deputies to the German Reichstag.

And so there is no racial right any more than an historical or geographical right; and if there *were* one, it would declare that the Corridor belongs to the Poles.

We have summed up the juridical arguments of German propaganda, and replied to them. We cannot but conclude that these arguments are without significance, and that public opinion need not bother itself with them.

Anyway, it is not in juridical terms that the question of the Corridor is being posed.

ON THE AIR IN THE U.S.

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen . . . Chas. A. Stevens and Co., State Street, Chicago's largest store for women . . . presents Mr. Clifton M. Utley, who will interpret and analyse the week's developments in foreign affairs. One of the chief reasons why smart women shop at Stevens again and again is that Stevens gives them all the advantages of the largest store for women in Chicago, yet is permeated with the personal atmosphere of a small, intimate shop. In every item of wearing apparel Stevens is more than well stocked! You can choose from wide selections in every price range, yet the service you receive is personalised—attuned to you as an individual. Stevens specialises in this type of service. If you desire, you will be given introduction cards from sales persons in one department to sales persons in any other section in which you wish to shop. Your personal shopping problems will be given the utmost and most interested attention. And now, Mr. Utley. . . .—*Introduction to Foreign Affairs Broadcast, Chicago.*

STOP!

Foreign observers in Berlin note that Nazi headquarters were particularly impressed, in reading President Roosevelt's message, by the occurrence of the word "stop" after each country: "Poland stop, Greece stop, etc., etc., stop."—*"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris.*

LATENT DANGER FOR GERMANY

by A. HAUSHOFER

From "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," Heidelberg

The seizure of Czecho-Slovakia was the first step in the establishment of the ideal new Europe envisaged by Herr Hitler—that is, a Europe from the Northern Baltic to the Black Sea in which there would be graduations of sovereignty, ranging from the supreme Reich of all Germans, through Protectorates on the model of Bohemia and Moravia, down to closely allied and economically bound "independent" States. The success or failure of the Czech experiment, in view of this vast plan, is of vital importance, as this expert on geo-politics indicates

GERMANY'S greatest task has been set her in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. . . . Nothing can alter the fact that there are to-day over seven million Czechs, that these seven million are imbued with a strong national consciousness, that this national consciousness has been given fresh foundation in the last three generations in a sharp struggle against the Germans, and that the voluntary action of the Czechs in requesting the protection of the Reich was mainly juristic in nature. There has certainly always been among the Czechs a line of thought which was conscious of the community of fate of the Bohemian peoples. But since 1848 that other line of thought has been a stronger, which began with Palacky (whose most important disciple was Masaryk) and which reached its political peak in Benes. This line of thought regarded the mission of the Czechs as enmity to everything German. This section has now been silenced, but it would be dangerous to believe that it has been extinguished or can be extinguished within a short period. Peoples who have had a long experience of lack of freedom acquire more subtle ways of disguise than peoples who have always known a certain measure of freedom, or peoples among whom at least small ruling groups have never completely forgotten the free word. The power of deception possessed by the eastern peoples has often made trouble for the Germans. Even in German sagas many a hero comes to grief owing to his lacking an ear for a danger which feigns, flatters and waits.

If twenty years are sufficient to form an historical judgment, it may be said that the Czechs (and not only the Czechs—most of the peoples ruling States between Germany and Russia) have not proved their worth as proprietors of a State of their own. As conspirators they were always very gifted. All rulers in the belt between the Gulf of Bothnia and the lower Danube found that enmity in friendly guise was very often more dangerous than honest resistance. Czarist Russia had this experience as well as the Habsburg State. The last to experience it were the German military authorities occupying territory in the period following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, who believed that they were ruling a great land when in reality everything had been hollowed out beneath them. The German Reich of to-day has before it on its path to the rule of lands beyond the German racial border in the east numerous tracks out of its own past—tracks which entice and tracks which warn. Should Germany succeed in its present attempt to establish a just order in Bohemia-Moravia (the fourth attempt made by Germans in the course of history) then, indeed, a step towards establishing order in Europe would have been taken which in its consequences could not be measured. For it would have been proved that the possibility exists of establishing a scaled national and State order in Europe, which could lead to still greater political amalgamations while maintaining necessary national rights. That German policy is aiming at such amalgamations at least in the economic-political field, she need no longer deny.

Only a Miracle Can Prevent War

The great question for the future is only whether the necessary time is going to be allowed for the development of such positive possibilities. . . . The attitude of France and England is now so stiffened that peoples and governments are no longer ready for further concessions. Daladier has been given complete powers to prepare general mobilisation in the economic field with dictatorial means. In England, Chamberlain has not been overthrown, but he has himself taken over leadership of those who no longer believe in a compromise between the authoritarian States and the Atlantic powers. All realisation that another war between the great powers of Europe would have for Europe similar consequences to those of the Peloponnesian war for Athens and Sparta, all realisation of the sinister racial-biological effect of modern war, can no longer restrain Europe from an almost arbitrary course, unless a series of psychological

miracles occur. Sober analysis is inclined to deny the possibility of such miracles. However, in times of great cultural changes, in times in which religions and philosophies of life are dying and being born, such miracles are not completely out of the question. But they cannot be counted upon. So it is that one must regard everything that happens this year in Europe from the point of view of strategic and economic use in military conflict. The Swedish-Finnish agreement about the fortification of the Aland islands, the refusal of civil air transport rights in Iceland, the success or failure of Marshal Pétain in Spain, the English settlement by force of the Palestine question—all these are only little preparatory moves in a world game of frightful gravity.

HIPPO, KING OF BEASTS

A toast to Pipo, the hippopotamus of the zoo in Madrid! He lost 2,000 of his 6,000 pounds during the siege of the Spanish capital, but, unlike the lions, tigers and wolves, he survived the ordeal.

A hero of modern warfare, then, is this sturdy animal. His body survived starvation while his nervous system triumphed over shell fire and aerial bombardment. Some of the war-mongering orators who in the past have spoken so much about valour and dash of the lion should change their tune. They should speak of the staying power of the hippo, and should paint his picture on their banners. War has changed.—*Richmond, U.S.A., "News Leader."*

"Times-Dispatch," Richmond, U.S.A. *"The Philadelphia Inquirer"*

TWO VIEWS ON AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

THE AXIS DIVIDES UP EUROPE

by GIOVANNI ANSALDO

From "Gazzetta del Popolo," Milan, 7.5.39

Did the Axis form itself into a military alliance with the object of embarking on a war? Not unless further encirclement forces the issue, according to this statement by a leading Italian publicist, which is regarded as an authentic account of the scope of the German-Italian pact

THE Axis is a system founded above all on the mutual and absolutely clear understanding of the position of the two countries, Italy and Germany. That is to say, each of the two countries recognises that the other has its own pre-eminent zone of interest, a zone in which it has special claims to affirm. For us, this zone is the entire Mediterranean region, where we have the right to speak the decisive word: for the Germans, their zone is Baltic and Eastern-Central Europe, where they have important ethnical minorities to protect, and great cultural and economic tasks to perform. Each of the two countries, of course, pursues the achievement of its own goals with absolute autonomy, without the other being strictly pledged to support it, only to make its path easier.

There is, however, one case—of the utmost importance—in which the solidarity of the Axis nations is binding and totalitarian: and that is, when a policy of encirclement is engineered against one or both of them: or when an ideological war is prepared and launched against them. In this case, as the two leaders have repeatedly declared, the two countries are resolved to espouse a common cause to the very utmost: because each knows only too well that the defeat of one would spell disaster for the other.

Once these principles have been laid down, we can, with a little good-will, understand the method employed by the two ministers (Count Ciano and Herr von Ribbentrop) in their examination of the situation. Their first concern must have been to consider whether those circumstances in which absolute and binding solidarity was to function, could be said to be present in an immediate and cogent form; in other words, their first concern must have been to assess the point reached by the policy of encirclement started by England. A few weeks ago it might have been considered that such a policy had become highly insidious,

and it was possible to believe that the Axis powers would have to react sooner or later with some grave act of solidarity. But, recently, the fall of Litvinoff has occurred, which—according to every reasonable deduction—suggests the return on the part of Russia to a policy of isolation; the possibility of effective encirclement becomes consequently much more reduced and distant. It is highly probable that the two ministers considered this new fact and its consequences; consequences which render less immediate the contingency of an ideological war on the part of the democratic states, and consequently less immediate the necessity for binding and absolute solidarity.

Secondly, the two ministers must have examined those questions of particular interest to each of them. It must have been a vast study, because the two countries, each on its own account, have "many irons in the fire"; it has been a study in which the minds of the two ministers travelled from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, stopping to examine Italian claims, the recent settlement of Albania, which makes Italy a great Balkan military power, the common concern of the two countries that Yugoslavia should consolidate its internal structure and its ties with the Axis states, and finally the question which is particularly alive and cogent throughout Europe, that is to say, the question of German claims on Danzig and of a way of communication between Germany and East Prussia, placed directly under the sovereignty of Germany. Just as Herr von Ribbentrop will have confirmed once more the close interest which the German Government takes in Italy's righteous cause in the Mediterranean, so Count Ciano will have assured the German Minister of Italy's full understanding for German claims in the Baltic, which can rightly be called "the Northern Mediterranean." But—contrary to the fables put forward by Anglo-Saxon and French war-mongers—from their exhaustive examination of this difficult but not tragic situation, no common decision has emerged, which might lead to a precipitation of events, and imperil European peace. On the contrary. . . .

NO OUTSIDERS, PLEASE

The *Matin,* in agreement in this respect with the *Daily Mail,* demands that the U.S.S.R. be kept out of the group of nations which England is in process of forming to check Germany.

While we're about it, we ought to keep out the United States too. On the other hand, we ought obviously to appeal to the Burgos Government to join.—"*Le Canard Enchainé,*" *Paris.*

THE POLISH CRISIS IN CARTOON

Stalin: "Please can I come under your umbrella too?"

"Mucha," Warsaw

"De Groene Amsterdammer," Amsterdam

HE DOESN'T FEEL LIKE DANCING

SUGGESTED SOLUTION OF THE CORRIDOR PROBLEM

"La Lumière," Paris

BRITAIN'S NEAR-EASTERN GAME
Winning Arabia and Turkey

by K. TH. UTHMANN (Cairo Correspondent)

From the "Berliner Lokalanzeiger," 3.5.39

In Egypt, the Near East and Turkey, British diplomacy has already scored enviable successes, and the end is not yet achieved, says this German newspaper correspondent

BEHIND the scenes of European crises, British diplomacy has for weeks been zealously working to strengthen the Empire's near Eastern position. The aim is to draw all Arab States more closely together and to form an Arabian community of interests, in which there will be one predominating influence only—that of Britain. These efforts can be traced in all capitals between Cairo and Baghdad.

In Egypt a war psychosis has been engendered which makes it possible to increase the number of British troops on the Nile threefold, without serious Egyptian opposition. It can be noted that the British agitators' slogans about the presence of German troops in Libya and the mobilisation of Italian forces on the Egyptian frontier, have had their effect. The express denials with which the Egyptian Prime Minister opposed these English lies were not sufficient, in a country stirred up by English agitators, to restore badly-needed calm.

While England has greatly strengthened her position in Egypt in the military field, she has in the diplomatic field handed over to that country a rôle which she has gratefully accepted—that of mediator in the Palestine dispute. This suits Egypt's book just as well as England's. Egypt aims at becoming the chief Arab power in the Near East, while the War Office is insisting ever more urgently on peace in Palestine's being secured at long last by diplomatic means.

For the revolt in Palestine, which the British have not been able to quell in spite of the use of all means of coercion, is regarded as a danger-point of the first order in England's rear, in the event of war in the Mediterranean. It is, therefore, not without the knowledge of the British Government that the Egyptian Government has been maintaining contact with the Arab leaders. In the solution of the Palestine problem, Egypt apparently is to play a particular part, by taking over a kind of guarantee that the settlement, once agreed on, shall not be hindered by the Jews. Such participation in Palestinian questions is quite in keeping

with the foreign policy of Egypt, which is pushing itself more and more to the fore in Near Eastern affairs and is even now regarded in the Arab world as the greatest Near Eastern Power.

Ousting the French in Syria

But the English Foreign Office's work in the Near East is by no means confined to territories which are already in Britain's sphere of interest. Britain's hand is once more to be seen in Syria. New attempts are being made to carry out the old plan of drawing Syria into Britain's sphere of interest. This plan is as old as the mandate solution for the Near East. Again and again, England has tried to push the French out of Syria and to link that country to the *bloc* of States controlled by, and allied to, Britain. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, to find that London has taken advantage of the disturbed state of Franco-Syrian relations to fish in troubled waters. Very cleverly, the English have started propaganda for union with Iraq. First it was Syrian students who called the late King Ghazi, King of Syria. Then, later, on the occasion of that monarch's accidental death, he was referred to as King Ghazi of Iraq and Syria. Voices demanding the union of Syria with Iraq multiplied, and could no longer be suppressed by French censorship. Finally the great *coup* came off—the Syrian Chamber met in the absence of the new Francophil Government and, in a resolution acclaimed by the majority, demanded the union of Syria and Iraq—that is, the inclusion of Syria in Britain's sphere of interest. In face of such a development the resigned attitude in French circles regarding France's prospects in Syria is understandable.

They already regard this game with Syria at the right moment, as it best, a bargaining counter, with which they may negotiate for political advantages in other directions.

London is playing this game with Syria at the right moment, as it is conducting negotiations with Turkey in order to bind Ankara still more closely to the chariot of the Empire. A price will be paid for Turkey's incorporation in the front against the authoritarian states: and the price is—parts of North Syria, and a free hand for Turkey in Aleppo. Should more of this disputed land go to Turkey, it will be all the easier for the inclusion of the rump State of Syria in Britain's sphere of interest to be accomplished. Unless tension in the European situation is relaxed and France can manage to offer greater resistance to London's

plans in Syria, we shall see the Sanjak game repeated on a grand scale. For it will be remembered that, with the Sanjak, Syria once before paid the price for Anglo-Turkish *rapprochement*.

In Iraq, also, England's position appears to have been considerably strengthened since the death of King Ghazi. The internal political situation there, always extremely restive, was greatly disturbed after the King's death by the question whether the Regency appointed for the child King, Feisal II, enjoyed enough authority to bridge over the racial, religious, and political discords which divide Mesopotamia. It is true that there is strong anti-British feeling in Iraq, which found dangerous expression in the murder of the British consul. But the situation is far too fluid for any effective opposition to be offered to British plans without seriously endangering the structure of the Iraq State. Here, too, England is using a policy of threats in order to turn public opinion against the authoritarian States. A masterpiece of such propaganda was the attempt made by the English Press to ascribe to Germany moral guilt for the regrettable murder of the consul.

TURKEY TO AID AGGRESSION

From the "Nationalzeitung," Essen, 12.5.39

AFTER years of a happy and healthy foreign policy Turkey has abandoned the path of neutrality and, by the conclusion of a Pact of mutual guarantee with Great Britain, has joined the British aggressive pact system directed against Germany and Italy. . . . The Turkish Government are playing the British game. They will not be in any doubt as to the consequences for Turkey. . . .

Only recently Turkey gave the Reich binding assurances on the observance of a policy of strict neutrality. With the Anglo-Turkish Pact, however, the Ankara Government have left this path and made themselves vassals of a policy the only aim of which can be collective war on behalf of Great Britain. In view of the Berlin-Rome Axis and the geographical position of Turkey it will be possible for Ankara itself to form an opinion as to whom this conclusion will affect the most. It should not, however, be imagined there that the limitation of this Pact to the Mediterranean will leave a less negative impression in Berlin than—as is also contemplated—full participation in the British encirclement system.

FAR-EASTERN AXIS

WHY JAPAN BACKED OUT

From "Oriental Affairs," Shanghai, April

GERMANY proposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact—to which she, Italy, Japan, Hungary and Manchoukuo are signatories—should be extended into a military alliance, in opposition to the proposed democratic front.

Japan has already signed "Cultural Pacts" for what they are worth, with Rome and with Berlin. And it is not difficult to believe that both Germany and Italy would welcome a Military Pact, on purely opportunist grounds. The Germans—as the speech of the German Chairman of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce on March 21st clearly revealed—are under no illusions as to the injury already done, and certain to continue, to foreign trade—including German trade—in China by the attempt to enforce the "New Order in Asia" policy. Though they have been accorded favoured treatment in some instances, their losses have relatively been little less than those of American and British traders. Protests to Berlin, however, have been ignored, or met with the rejoinder that it is not for German merchants in China to interfere in the considered foreign policy of the Reich. Germany, who had substantial interests in China's trade, and Italy, whose interests are insignificant, would apparently be quite willing to risk sacrificing their entire commercial interests in the Far East to ensure an armed attack upon British and French territories and interests in this part of the globe.

The German proposal, however, appears to have gone too far even for the most chauvinistic of the Japanese military and naval leaders to stomach. It is stated that it would involve the despatch of the Japanese fleet half-way round the globe without possessing a single naval base or guarantee of compensation. It is hardly surprising that this wildcat scheme is opposed by the Japanese naval authorities. Moving a battle fleet half way round the globe without possessing a single naval base or fuelling station west of longitude 120° east is hardly an undertaking that would commend itself to any practical Naval Command, especially when, if the hazardous voyage to the Red Sea were actually made, the fleet might find itself blocked at Suez. The Naval Staff at Tokyo must still have memories of the pitiful odyssey of the Russian Baltic Fleet, which

had the advantage of accommodation in neutral ports, and experienced no opposition en route, in 1904-5. And it certainly does not reckon upon a cruise to Europe meeting with no oposition, and being granted harbour, docking and fuelling facilities all along the route.

The Japanese Army also appears to be opposed to unlimited commitments in the event of a European conflict. The War Minister is reported to favour an alliance directed only against Soviet Russia, which from the German viewpoint would be of limited value, inasmuch as it would be unlikely to affect the manpower at the disposal of the Soviet Government in the west.

Mr. Arita, Japan's Foreign Minister, is said to be opposed to the proposed Military Pact on several grounds. For one thing he fully realises that financial assistance in the reconstruction of China will not be forthcoming from the Totalitarian Powers, for the simple reason that they do not possess the resources to give it. And though this has not been mentioned in the Tokyo cables, it may reasonably be assumed that he also has an eye upon the potential effects of such a pact upon the policy of the United States.

Unequal to War with Britain and France

Already committed far more than was ever anticipated to military operations in China, and with the possibility that a breach with Soviet Russia may occur even without an alliance directed against her, it would be reckless to assume that Japan's naval, military and economic resources would be equal to the task of waging war upon Britain and France (in addition to Russia and China) in Asia. For she would have to do so unaided, and with the additional risk that the United States would not remain disinterested. The immediate result of embarking upon such an adventure would, of course, be a self-imposed blockade. Practically all of Japan's oversea shipping would become hostages, and if, as would be almost certain in such a case, teeth were put into the Neutrality Act, not a Japanese ship, or a vessel trading with Japan, would be able to enter or sail from any American port. Attacks upon Hongkong or Singapore would be a very different proposition from even the fiercest engagements in the present invasion of China. Moreover Singapore is nearly 5,000 miles from Suez, 1,400 miles from Hongkong, and 1,540 miles from Japan's nearest territory, Formosa. If it is correct to assume that a battle fleet cannot operate safely and continuously at more than 500 to 750

miles from its nearest base, the formidable character of any naval operations directed against Britain will be apparent. Bombing or bombarding Hongkong or Singapore would not re-open the route for Japanese shipping to Europe or Australia, or release the Japanese vessels which would undoubtedly be held at every British port.

CHINA'S CAVE SCHOOLS

From the "North-China Herald," Shanghai

"CAVE SCHOOLS" have sprung on like mushrooms in Kwangsi. They are so called because they are located in caves which are abundantly found in that mountainous province which has been made a target of bombings by Japanese 'planes. The "cave educational system" was invented by a well-known Chinese educator, Mr. Tao Tze-shing, and has been found most practical. Students from other parts of the country are flocking to "cave schools."

Mr. Tao hit upon the novel idea and submitted a proposal to the provincial authorities who at once put his "cave educational system" into practice. Such a system is badly needed in Kwangsi as the educational authorities there have marked this year as "adult education year" during which the 13,000,000 natives of Kwangsi will have to receive what they term "war resistance education."

In Kweilin alone there are 18 big mountain caves. The biggest among them is capable of holding 20,000 persons. The Wartime Mass Education School is now housed in it. It is like the Kon Jih Ta Hsueh or the "Japan-Resisting College" which has been established by communists in Yengan, Shensi where students study in "cave" classrooms.

There are many radio sets in cave schools and students are constantly informed of what is going on in the world. The Chinese air force headquarters often broadcast news about aerial bombings. "Cave libraries" are housed in small caves and various charts and photographs are hung on cave walls.

GOLDEN REFUGE

The United States Treasury is buying foreign gold at the rate of about £8,000,000 weekly, and at this rate of progress would own all the gold in the world by 1946.—*"News Chronicle."*

JAPAN TURNS SOUTH
The Threat to France's Colony

by AIR COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

From the Bulletin of "Far Eastern Service," London

IT has to be remembered that Japan is a first-class naval power, as well as being strong on land, and that the war of invasion, which absorbs her military energies, has not called forth any corresponding exertion from her fleet. In consequence her ships-of-war are straining at their anchors, eager for employment and anxious to assert their capacity for sea-power.

In Japan there are two schools of thought in regard to her expansion, the Continental and the South Sea, the former being identified with her Army and the latter with her Navy.

Professional rivalry exists between the two Services, and the military mutiny of 1936, during the premiership of Admiral Okada, was an expression of the Army's insistence that naval policy should not gain the upper hand.

In effect, that policy operated to discountenance serious military adventure on the mainland, chiefly because of the dangerous liability of long land frontiers, and to use the resources of the country on advancing sea-power towards the south.

For the last three years the Army has completely ruled the roost, and the Chinese "incident" is a continuation of the interrupted policy of expansion on the Continent, the ulterior object of which is to make the heavy industries of Japan for ever independent of foreign supply.

Nevertheless, the Navy is still attracted to its "Nankai" (South Sea) programme and must have urged the advisability of occupying Hainan, and of seizing the Spratly Reefs, with an eye to furthering its ambition under the pretext of military necessity.

The seizure of the Spratly Isles can have no relation to the war with China. . . . It is an act of sheer impudence towards France to whom, more properly, the group belongs, and would be requited as such if the situation in Europe did not tie the hands of the French and deter them from aggressive measures of remonstrance.

The Anti-Comintern Alliance, ostensibly directed against the spread of Soviet doctrine, can be used in other ways as well, and there can be

little doubt that the senior European partners are in consultation with Japan over her policy of sea-encroachment south.

In the same connection the fact must not be overlooked that a strategic value attaches to Japanese ownership of the Spratlys as an aircraft base for future operations in the East Indian area when the World War breaks. . . .

The occupation of Hainan, in the face of a French warning against such action, is another straw to show the direction of the South Sea wind, although it must be confessed that military necessity might be pleaded in that particular instance.

The junk traffic from Hainan to the Kwantung coast did develop into a gun-running activity of some importance which it was desirable to end. But its chief significance lies in the fact that a potential enemy is gradually encircling French Indo-China, and can already exercise pressure against its northern territory via the Gulf of Tongking.

It is little realised how weak, in a military sense, French Indo-China is, though it is quite patent that she would have great difficulty, at the present juncture, in reinforcing her strength so far from home.

For the time being Japan is cock of the naval walk down there, and as soon as the prospect brightens for her of a European war she will be in a position to do some easy mopping up.

Siam, France's nearest land neighbour, has no great liking for her, and remembers that the French colony includes territory formerly part and parcel of her kingdom, which was forcibly acquired. Siam, which does not view with abhorrence the depredations of Japan in China, has a law of universal service and possesses a navy and air force neither of which are negligible quantities.

When the "show down" takes place, French Indo-China would be most uncomfortably placed between the land pressure of Siam and the sea-power of Japan.

To provide for these ,and other eventualities, there is little doubt that Japan is making preliminary dispositions. . . . There need no longer be a choice between a Continental and a South Sea policy, and service rivalry may die a natural death. The Nankai policy can be prosecuted hand in hand with aggression on the mainland, for, in her magnificent ideal, there will be no local power to oppose her. Such are the plain significances of her fleet activities of late.

ODDMENTS

GOERING NEW-LAIDS

To use a very graphic American expression, this autarchian business is likely to get into somebody's hair sooner or later. With the news that the German Farmer's Organisation has announced that *Ersatz* eggs will shortly come on the market, speculation must naturally be aroused as to how long it will be when farmers and the like will become entirely unnecessary to the State. *Ersatz* eggs, it is stated, are made from skimmed milk. They can be scrambled, fried and cooked in all the ways that the natural product can be prepared, though naturally there must be some cause for wonder as to how it can be boiled, unless the German scientist has devised an *Ersatz* eggshell to surround the milk-derived yolk and white.—*"North-China Herald," Shanghai.*

SLOGAN WITH A KICK

"Bear, Propagate and Overrun the Earth" is the slogan which Japan's Welfare Ministry is using to stimulate an increase in this nation's population.

Recent figures indicate that the war in China is cutting down Japan's birth rate to the point where deaths are exceeding births. The war has been held responsible for a drop of from 300,000 to 40,000 in the number of births during 1938.

Japan's new population drive is based on the necessity of keeping an army of occupation in China for many years to come, of building up a wall of Japanese colonists along the Manchuria-Soviet border and of creating a domestic labour supply capable of meeting the demands of industries which are expected to boom when and if China is "reconstructed."—*"North-China Herald," Shanghai.*

CRAZY IDEAS

Shade of Cyrus W. Field! A plan is being made to lay an oil pipe from Canada to England. When the American public first heard of Field's project, it laughed itself out of nearly a week's work. But the cable was laid. It is a poor ocean whose bed isn't criss-crossed with cables. A pipeline? Well, why not? It isn't half so crazy as the cable was 70 years ago. Crazy ideas working make the world go round.—*Fort Worth (Tex.) "Star Telegram."*

LOVE, THE GENERAL AND THE FIRING SQUAD

General Wang Kao-nan, who was recently dismissed from his post as the garrison commander in Ningpo because he had violated the new military order forbidding officers to marry during the hostilities, has been executed by a firing squad according to Chinese reports from Kinhwa, the war-time capital of Chekiang.—*"North-China Herald," Shanghai.*

AND HOW!

A sound laboratory, in Toledo, finds that it can sour milk by sound waves, and then reverse the process to sweeten the milk again. Sound waves also can be produced to create nausea.—*"Wall Street Journal."*

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

While we do not agree with many of the conclusions in this letter, we print it as an interesting contribution to an important subject.—EDITOR.

CALL A REAL PEACE CONFERENCE!

SIR,—Herr Hitler has spoken in reply to President Roosevelt and, so far as I have been able to ascertain, no organ of public opinion anywhere, however inclined to bellicosity, has been able to interpret his speech as a declaration, veiled or otherwise, of war on the world. It is apparently suggested in official American circles that he has kept the door to peace just ajar. That seems to me a niggardly and ungenerous estimate. It is true that he denounced his treaty with Poland and the naval agreement with Great Britain as a tactical reply to the arrangements recently concluded between the two countries in question, but he simultaneously announced his readiness to re-negotiate treaties on similar lines with both countries. The question of Danzig and the suggested German corridor across the Polish Corridor is certainly a somewhat serious stumbling-block in the way of a mutual accommodation, but the Anglo-Polish guarantee itself seems to have left that self-same problem in a state of suspense, which cannot but constitute a grave menace to peace.

It appears to be the case that on this issue Poland is to be the sole judge as to whether any future development in the Danzig situation constitutes a threat to her independence and that, in the event of her deciding in the affirmative, we are bound to support her in arms against Germany. We are thus running a very serious risk of precipitating a war on a thoroughly trivial issue, which we should at once take the initiative of removing by a tripartite agreement. It is scarcely credible that Mr. Chamberlain's Government contemplates plunging Europe into war on the question whether a German town, severed from Germany by the Versailles treaty, should be or not be restored to Germany.

The Polish newspapers may assert that Danzig is the larynx of their country, but we at least should not encourage the Polish Government to breathe fire through that organ. The Corridor is admittedly rather a different matter—another fragment of the irresponsible vagaries of Versailles—but, with the Danzig question settled, it should not be incapable of resolution provided all parties are animated by good will.

It is no good looking a gift horse in the mouth. Herr Hitler has deliberately gone out of his way to be both complimentary and conciliatory towards Great Britain. It is stupid, wicked, and untrue to suggest that this attitude is the result of the recent access of jingoism in this country, the conscription of schoolboys and all that—the denunciation of the Naval Agreement is sufficient disproof of that. No, Hitler, as an aspirant to imperial status, recognises the existence of other empires, which have to be accepted as part of the natural order of things. There is no democratic cant about him, but there is not a word in his whole speech—or, indeed, in any other speech of his that I remember—suggesting a desire to go to war with us, though he does make it clear that he is not afraid of such a war if we force it upon him. We must not do that. Whatever calculations we may make regarding our chances of success—and I am convinced that they are far from dim—the price to be paid is altogether too hideous to be contemplated. No, we must not do that.

Like Mr. Chamberlain, President Roosevelt and others, Herr Hitler is a

demagogue. His words are intended for world-wide consumption by the crowd, and not for philosophic dissection and examination under a microscope. In many passages of his self-justification his speech was specious enough, avoiding awkward matters like his reference to the "last territorial demands he had to make in Europe." Nevertheless his assault all along the line on the Treaty of Versailles and his boast of having reconstituted and united the enemy empires dismembered by that extraordinary instrument are justified by both the merits and the facts of the matter. British sentiment, so tender towards the Czechs and so shocked by their fate, tends to forget that Czecho-Slovakia was a modern product of hate and revenge scarcely likely to survive the cooling of the passions which had created it. And no part of Hitler's speech was more effective than that in which he exposed the rôle for which Czecho-Slovakia was destined by the anti-German policy of France and Russia.

Herr Hitler has by implication, if not explicitly, renewed his old proposal for a drastic limitation of armaments. He has produced an imposing inventory of the military material of which Germany was deprived by the post-war settlement. He has shewn to the satisfaction of all reasonable critics that the victorious powers never attempted to make any serious contribution to permanent peace by comparable reductions in their armed strength. And he has repeated the figures which he had in mind—figures that seem almost ludicrous by our modern standards; figures that nevertheless would largely take the sting out of war in the event of an accidental explosion; figures, therefore, which should be accepted in principle as the basis of a conference of the principal Powers—not all the States of the world—for a peaceful settlement of the world's troubles.

President Roosevelt may, naturally enough, feel a little aggrieved at Herr Hitler's reaction to his initiative. He has, however, a rare opportunity of showing the essential qualities of greatness. He can indeed save the peace of the world by extracting the kernel of hope from the bitter fruit of Hitler's sarcasm and labouring it to grow into a tree of goodwill for our generation and, perhaps, longer. If the principal Powers of the world—I envisage Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan and America—are prepared to accept Herr Hitler's figures, an army of 200,000 or 300,000 men with comparable limitations of the national Navies and Air Forces, then we would be wise indeed to inform Herr Hitler of our readiness to participate in a new Peace Conference for the purpose of securing general disarmament on the scale suggested by him and of our agreement in principle, subject to the realisation of such disarmament and the working out of the necessary details, to the following terms:—

(*a*) the return to Germany of Danzig (if necessary as a preliminary to the Conference);

(*b*) the return to Germany of all the extra-European colonies surrendered by her at Versailles;

(*c*) the revision, without any prejudice whatever, of all other territorial arrangements arising out of that treaty;

(*d*) the genuine internationalisation of all mandated territories not covered by (*b*);

(*e*) the internationalisation of all important waterways, such as the Suez and Panama canals, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the Straits of Gibraltar, etc.;

and

(*f*) the consideration and settlement in a spirit of reciprocal goodwill of any other matter of international interest and concern.

I believe that the totalitarian Powers would accept a Conference on these lines. I fear that national interests and prejudices may discourage the Democratic Powers from taking any initiative in such a direction. It is President Roosevelt's opportunity and his duty to the world. Will he rise to the occasion? If he does the world will salute him, as it once, though prematurely, saluted President Wilson, as the saviour of civilisation.

H. St. J. B. Philby.

*London, N.W.*6.

POSTSCRIPT

In a recent letter to *The Times,* Sir Norman Angell lends his powerful support to the policy of what Herr Hitler regards as "encirclement" and he himself calls "collective resistance to Germany's domination." Much of our trouble at the present time is due to the employment of catch-phrases of this kind which are logically inter-changeable. The Duke of Windsor in his recent broadcast, so strangely banned by the B.B.C., did a notable service to the cause of peace by appealing for a truce to such words as "aggression" and "encirclement." And it is perhaps time for us to try and understand exactly what such words or phrases mean, particularly because they are equally the causes of all the preparations now being made for war by those who will be the protagonists in Armageddon if and when it bursts upon the world to destroy it. I do not believe that war will be the outcome of the present tension, but one can never be certain that some accident may not precipitate it. That is the danger.

To my mind "aggression," in the sense which that word is used by the "democratic" states, connotes the declared dissatisfaction of the totalitarian states with the existing state of affairs in the world and their determination to change it, by peaceful means if possible, or by maintaining an attitude of military menace that will keep the world in an uncomfortable state of tension or, in the last resort, by war if war is the only available method of securing a decision on their claims. On the other hand "encirclement," in the sense in which the word is used by the totalitarian states, means the determination of the "democratic" states to resist, if necessary in arms, any further change in the world's balance without their consent, which they do not intend to give, and the maintenance of a menacing attitude towards the totalitarians to discourage the jumping of their claims, in the vague hope that the totalitarian states may adopt a peaceful attitude and so give the "democrats" a tactical advantage in their policy of refusing all concessions.

The result of both attitudes is substantially the same, and the division of the world into two hostile armed camps is rapidly nearing completion. The indefinite prolongation of such a state of affairs means the inevitability of war, whose outbreak will be the result of some accident. So the position at the present moment discloses active preparations for war on all sides by a number of mutually distrustful nations, none of which really wants war. And it is a remarkable paradox of the situation that the two nations most disposed to risk war if necessary (Germany and Italy) have been the loudest in proclaiming :—

(1) their desire for peace;
and
(2) the terms on which they are prepared to accept a peaceful settlement.

The "democratic" nations on the other hand have so far only declared :—

(1) their genuine desire for peace—on their own terms;
and
(2) an unwillingness to consider any terms of peace until the other side lays down its arms.

So we get to a complete *impasse,* and Sir Norman Angell produces reasons for maintaining that state of affairs on purely ideological grounds. He dislikes dictators with the exception of the Russian species. He sympathises, as we all do, with China and Abyssinia in their travail, but he does not appreciate that Palestine has suffered in a somewhat similar way, also Syria—and the examples might be multiplied. It is really not a question of red, brown or black ideology—it is nothing but a question of imperialism. Sir Norman Angell realises that Japan, Italy and Germany may have had right on their side in their various quarrels, but he does not think that they should have used force to settle the issue. Similarly France and Great Britain may have had right on their side in their disputes with Syria but of course they, as "democratic" states, were perfectly justified in settling those issues by force as there was clearly no other way of doing it.

And so we go round the burning bush, waiting and almost wishing for it to singe us. A sort of madness is rapidly enveloping the world, whose every military tendency is being called into play by all the weapons of propaganda. And out of the storm Mussolini thunders his opinion that there is nothing in the European situation of to-day demanding the drawing of the sword to cut the knots into which we have tied ourselves. And no man ever spoke a truer word.

I have already sketched the lines of a possible solution. The details can be worked out easily enough if only Mr. Chamberlain is prepared to state that the reasonable demands of the totalitarians will be conceded on the basis of universal disarmament. That is the real issue—the only effective barrier between war and peace.

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HOW HISTORY WAS MADE

LOST LIBERTY? THE ORDEAL OF THE CZECHS AND THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM. By Joan and Jonathan Griffin. *Chatto and Windus.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by JAN MASARYK*

DURING the present mournful period in the life of the Czech nation I have derived much solace and encouragement from a number of books by English writers who, of their own free will, and as impartial eye-witnesses, have recorded with fierce indignation the brutal treatment to which my country has fallen a victim. Mr. and Mrs. Griffin have now produced a worthy addition to volumes of this character. They have set down the results of their observations in Prague and elsewhere from last September until the end of 1938, that *"année terrible"* in our history, and they have supplemented these first-hand details with quotations from newspapers and official documents. They have thus provided a very complete, graphic and reliable account of what took place in public and also behind the scenes, and the story which they have to tell is an appalling one. Perhaps I can best do justice to the merits of their book by saying that its pages brought back to me with an overwhelming vividness the atmosphere of tension and distress which accompanied the events culminating in the outrage on March 15th.

Here and there the authors reach conclusions which I do not altogether endorse, but in the main I can only express my admiration for the courage and ability which they have shown in marshalling such an array of stark, unescapable facts. My feeling is one of gratitude for an honest effort to tell those who are willing to learn of the present-day Germany's idea of self-determination, which they, for instance, claim for the City of Danzig, at the same time suppressing with uneducated brutality the very fundamentals of the principle as far as my people are concerned.

* M. Jan Masaryk, the son of the famous first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, was until Munich his country's Minister in London.

BRITAIN IN SOUTHERN ARABIA

SHEBA'S DAUGHTERS. By H. St. J. B. Philby. *Methuen.* 21*s.* 0*d.* *Illus.*

Reviewed by A. W. LAWRENCE*

THREE years ago Mr. Philby set out from the centre of Arabia to complete the first crossing of the vast peninsula from north to south. This instalment of his narrative covers the southern part of his nine months' travel, beginning and

ending at a place not marked on the map; the earlier stages are to be published later. He does not tell us so, but one may guess that his reasons for taking events out of their natural order were mostly political.

It is characteristic of modern Arabia that his whole journey was made by car, except for the passage of a range of mountains; and he implies that it is equally characteristic that this one impracticable stretch of road should lie in the British territory of Aden. The book consists, to a large extent, of a well-documented plea that England should give attention to the problems of the Aden Protectorate. No doubt it would be unfair to say that there has been a conspiracy of silence on the subject, but it is distinctly odd that the empire's sole accession of territory in recent years should have passed almost unnoticed. And it is still growing.

Before the War, Aden itself and its immediate environs formed part politically of British India, while some of the surrounding country remained under tribal rule, but acknowledged Indian suzerainty. No government servant even tried to penetrate the interior of the Protectorate; the only people who made an attempt were an English couple with an Indian surveyor, and an Austrian, and neither party could get very far because of the insecurity of life. During the War the "protected" area was largely occupied by enemy forces, while the Aden garrison concentrated on keeping the port secure. After the war, India gave some thought to the Protectorate, but soon surrendered all its rights over Aden to the Colonial Office. No startling developments ensued till the era of Italian expansion came in sight; then the British Protectorate increased by thousands of square miles on the map, though it continued to make little visible difference on the ground. That came later, when young officers were turned loose into the wilds to compose a belated *pax britannica,* in regions where boundaries of tribes and sultanates had never been defined or accepted, where wars and feuds and murderous highwaymen were strangling civilisation. They did the job, in district after district, by virtue of their personal character and local illusion that other Englishmen were like them, and by means of patient discussion of the scheme's advantages; but on occasion the violent still clung to violence for a livelihood, and the R.A.F. supported the argument with bombs. These sometimes hit the wrong person, so patently that compensation has even been paid to the relations.

Mr. Philby has a horror of bombing from the air, and he is fervent against Aden's higher officials on all possible grounds. His indictment—parts of which he has made extremely amusing—deserves serious consideration. He cites instances to show that they have done little to improve the more accessible areas which they have long claimed as their preserve, that in the interior they do not know who owns what, their news service is bad, and their ambitions vastly exceed their effectiveness. He anticipates that the expansion policy, which already causes irritation to independent Arab states, will lead to serious friction. Incidentally his journey, made under the auspices of King Ibn Saud, seems to be resulting in a Saudian protectorate over an area claimed by Aden (p. 346).

The decision to take charge of Southern Arabia was apparently an expedient to check Italian ambitions, and the British occupation should surely be declared a temporary measure.

Mr. Philby knows Arabia better than any man has ever done, and it is scarcely necessary to say that his book will have a permanent value as a geographical document. It deals largely, too, with

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ancient topography and history, and reports a number of archæological discoveries, the full significance of which cannot yet be properly assessed, but which already give some idea of the country's past and have suggested to the author an attractive theory as to the origin of the Phœnicians.

* Mr. A. W. Lawrence, brother of Colonel T. E. Lawrence, is Director of the Museum of Classical Archæology, Cambridge.

OUR CONTINENT OF SORROW

TRAGEDY OF ERRORS. By Count Hans Huyn. *Hutchinson.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

MARSHAL PILSUDSKI. By W. F. Reddaway. *Routledge.* 15*s.* 0*d.*

GERMANY RAMPANT. By Ernest Hambloch. *Duckworth.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

BULGARIAN CONSPIRACY. By J. Swire. *Robert Hale.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

EYE-WITNESS IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. By Alexander Henderson. *Harrap.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

THREE MEN TRIED. By Edgar Stern-Rubarth. *Duckworth.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

HERE are six more books about Europe, and of them all I should take Count Hans Huyn's *Tragedy of Errors* as the first to be read. In this book are things, deeply felt, well described, and that makes a good book. Count Huyn was one of Kaiser Franz Joseph's naval officers. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Count Huyn's world, crumbled about his ears, he entered the service of little post-war Austria, an orphan among the European States, groping in the dark. Being convinced, after the war, that the ultimate answer to the question of Austria's future lay in the union of all Germans, he transferred to the German service, and for years was Press Attaché at the German Legation in Warsaw. He was no Hitlerist, and soon after Hitler came to power he changed back to the Austrian service; he was at the Austrian Legation in London until Hitler's march into Vienna left him once more with his occupation gone.

This is one of the best books about Austria in particular and Europe in general that I have read. Also—a rare thing in these times—it is by a real Austrian, and what greater tragedy could there be than that of the native-born son of that lovely land who feels himself, as such men must, a German—an Austrian-German— and is now in the wilderness? If you ever knew Austria, you will know that Count Huyn's pictures of Vienna in wartime, the playground of the ghouls that make and fatten on wars, and of Austria at intervals after the war are true in every detail and unforgettable.

For my part, I shall always keep Count Huyn's book on my shelves and dip into it whenever I think of Austria, which is very often.

One of the most timely of recent books is Mr. Reddaway's *Marshal Pilsudski,* with an excellent coloured frontispiece which tells the reader so much about the character of the remarkable old Marshal that he turns with a mind already receptive to the book. The Marshal was one of the group of men who founded new States in post-war Europe and thus, in their later years, saw the reward of years of suffering—Pilsudski knew both Russian and German prisons. Masaryk was another; to-day Masaryk is dead and his Czecho-Slovakia has been blotted out. The spotlight has turned on Poland, and the propaganda batteries are beginning their drumfire. The cruel threat of a new partitioning hangs over the country. Pilsudski's life was Poland's life, and Mr. Reddaway's book gives at this moment an excellent picture of that little-understood land.

AMBASSADORS AT LARGE

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Mr. Ernest Hambloch is known from his book of reminiscences, *British Consul,* which was published last year. According to the record of his service given on the cover of *Germany Rampant,* he has spent most of his consular service in countries outside Germany, and the depth of knowledge of the German character, of German philosophy and of the budding of the German longing for world-domination contained in this book is astonishing. His view is that German foreign policy has never ceased to be inspired by the dream of "World Conquest or Downfall," and if you can read this well-written and well-documented book and come to any other conclusion your sales-resistance must be exceptionally high. This, too, is a book to read.

Mr. Swire, in *Bulgarian Conspiracy,* has at last provided a book about Bulgaria, which, I should think, must be about the least-known country in Europe. He has done an enormous labour and many readers of this book will be surprised to know of the tragic and dramatic things that have happened in a country which for years has seemed like a political blank on the map of Europe. He writes as a severe critic of King Boris and as the champion of one of the chief protagonists in the struggle for the soul of Bulgaria—Colonel Damian Veltcheff, now languishing, and likely long to languish, in captivity. Many of the events he describes in the post-war history of Bulgaria would, if enacted on a bigger stage, have staggered the world; because they happened in distant, and censor-fenced Bulgaria, the world never learned more of them than was contained in brief and incomprehensible news items. For people who are interested to-day in learning about Europe, near and far, it is a gap not to have a book about Bulgaria on the shelves, and Mr. Swire's book fills it.

Mr. Alexander Henderson's *Eye-Witness in Czecho-Slovakia* is an account of the tragedy which is fresh in all minds, and the results of which, for Europe and for Britain, are only now gradually becoming clear. In *Three Men Tried,* Dr. Stern-Rubarth, a journalist who closely collaborated with Stresemann and has been an exile from Germany since 1933, gives a first-hand account of those post-war years of political interplay between Stresemann, Briand and Austen Chamberlain which once seemed to promise so much hope for the future of Europe and ultimately ended in the triumph of Hitler and our present plight. Melancholy to read, but it belongs to the picture of the whole.

ETHIOPIA FELIX

BEHOLD OUR NEW EMPIRE. By Louise Diel. *Hurst and Blackett.* 10. 6*d.*

Reviewed by STUART EMENY

MUSSOLINI said to Frau Louise Diel "Go and see for yourself what things are like in our new country." And straightway Frau Diel packed off to become the first woman visitor to the Duce's stolen Empire. She travelled 6,250 miles by road and air through Abyssinia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, looked through Nazi spectacles, and has now returned to utter a 90,000 word pæan of praise.

She saw the Fascist Empire builders at work. She watched them town planning, house building, setting up schools and hospitals, legislating, developing industries and extending the excellent network of roads started during the war.

There is, she says, tremendous enthusiasm everywhere—even if some of the colonists are homesick.

Whether all this effort will ever pay remains to be seen. Certainly after three years' research the Italians do not seem to

have found much of the Abyssinian mineral wealth or of Mr. Rickett's oil, of which we heard so much.

According to Frau Diel the natives are much happier under their conquerors than they were under the Emperor. (I have no means of checking this as all my Abyssinian friends who did not escape with the Emperor have been bumped off).

"The natives" continues Frau Diel "are insensitive to physical and mental pain, and they know few feelings of joy," but even so the Italians have from the start "treated them as humans."

Then we are told that the Fascists' "strong love for children is the reason why many pay special attention to the pretty, black curly headed native women." This big-heartedness has led to a serious sex problem which has its perils in a country where eighty per cent of the population suffers from disease.

VOICES IN THE DARK

THE LABYRINTH OF EUROPE. By Michael Burn. *Methuen.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

PEACE WITH GANGSTERS? By George Glasgow. *Cape* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by SIR ROGER CHANCE

FORCE is the final arbiter between national sovereign States, if other and more reasonable methods fail. Germany under Hitler repudiates other methods in advance. The sacred right of the German *Volk* takes precedence over all other interests, even world interests. The end justifies the means, and so bad faith—indeed, every device of Machiavellian doctrine—becomes a principle of foreign policy. How shall Great Britain, one of the scorned democracies, meet this challenge?

Mr. Burn is young in age, and when he writes that his book "is an attempt roughly to analyse the reasons why we

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By ALEXANDER HENDERSON
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feel so little confidence in our rulers, and to outline a path in foreign policy which may perhaps correspond to the ideas of a large number of ordinary individuals," at least one reader began to doubt whether he could have much confidence in Mr. Burn. But it transpires that Mr. Burn has written a most intelligent and well-balanced study of the problems that confront our Empire to-day. If he is suspicious of our rulers, his judgment on Mr. Chamberlain's policy is most fair-minded: he is too sane and well-informed to adopt the ideology of the Fascist or the Communist. And the chapters on Soviet Russia are of especial value at the present time. Discussing Stalin, he says, "there is good evidence for holding the orthodox opinion that his real goal is still the world revolution."

My one serious criticism of Mr. Burn is that he is too verbose. The same can be said of Mr. Glasgow, who since 1920 has been Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Observer*, and writes on foreign affairs for the *Contemporary Review*. Mr. Glasgow expounds an interesting thesis. Why in so doing should it be necessary to cover the well-trodden ground of European politics since Versailles, and to tell in greater detail the story of the past eighteen months—a story that must be fresh in the minds of most newspaper readers? There are no revelations in Mr. Glasgow's account; and it is an account that is badly arranged. He jumps from one place to another: from Munich to Versailles and back again.

The thesis commands our attention. It is this: that "shadow force" is doing the work of "active force." The nations are frightened of war. But "the war" that people talk about as a possibility is in fact half over. And when the diplomatic lever of British re-armament has exercised its full effect, there is a reasonable prospect of limitation of armaments by agreement. Perhaps these few words do small justice to Mr. Glasgow's point of view. He loyally defends the man with the umbrella as the wise exponent of this new technique, even though he "had his leg pulled" at Munich. Let us hope that Mr. Glasgow's faith will be justified. The dogs of Europe *may* snarl at each other and turn away, for a time. Yet surely they will not lie down together, unless a superior person with a superior weapon arrives to apportion the bones.

PASARON

ENGLISH CAPTAIN. By Tom Wintringham. *Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

SALAZAR: PORTUGAL AND ITS LEADER. By Antonio Ferro. *Faber.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by JOHN MARKS

THE first of these books, bound by the publisher almost as companion volumes, was in the press when General Franco opened his successful drive on Barcelona. The speed of this offensive, greater even than that of his race for Madrid, made Wintringham's book an also-ran. It appeared five days before the Republic's final collapse. But as it is mainly concerned with one battalion's part in one battle, and that an all-important action in which the International Brigade were hard-pressed yet victorious, much of it can be recommended to students of military history and to all who are attracted by the literature of war.

The author commanded the British volunteers who for four days in February 1937, on the banks of the Jarama, fought desperately to hold—and held—Franco's thrust at the Valencia road. His description of this fighting and a résumé of two lectures delivered to his men in training (Chapters 6-11) are as vivid as Orwell's, Romilly's and Pitcairn's accounts of their experiences on the Aragon front, at Boadilla, and in the Guadarramas, and as instructive as Borkenau's and Bláz-

quez's views on the course and conduct of the war. His previous five chapters, dealing with Brigade personalities and life in camp, are dull—but not his conclusions, strategic and tactical, which should be seriously studied. Probably these err a little on the side of heterodoxy, for its own or democracy's sake ("modern war, in its present shape, calls for the sort of initiative that arises from democracy; that is, I believe, the principal meaning of this book"—"Heaven help the soldier who tries to make plans regardless of circumstances and accident and opposition, as the Germans did before 1914 and as they are doing again now"—"it is only a democracy that can avoid the irreparable mistake of treating its infantry as cannon-fodder").

Certainly that solid new partisanship which takes the place of the old stalwart patriotism in this English captain's mind led him not only to base his understanding of war "less on the theories of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart than on those of Friedrich Engels, and on the general Marxist idea of the connections between war and politics," but also to underestimate his opponents in Spain.

Despite his own division of the war into five rounds, four of which unquestionably went to Franco (and the last to prove a knock-out), it was perhaps natural that he should attribute all the blunders to "the authoritarian army" and, in large part, to "the inevitable mediocrity of its generals"; but surely the common error of indiscriminately labelling all Franco's troops Fascist should not have blinded him, a soldier, to the obvious fact that the Moors, the Tercio, and the Navarrese possessed that very resourcefulness and individual fighting quality which he so values. Comparing the American and Spanish civil wars, he himself says: "On the Southern

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side in the States, on the Fascist side in Spain, were the men who had been taught to ride," pitted against those who had learned to "fell trees and hammer steel to shape": this would seem to weaken Captain Wintringham's argument that the Nationalists were a mechanical and clumsy force, especially as he admits that "no war of liberation has been lost because of weight of armaments alone." In any case, other British military observers have declared that what impressed them most about Franco's army was precisely the decision and initiative of his field officers. But, for the author, if one side in this civil war waged a battle purely for prestige, it is obscurantism—whereas the other was right in doing the same to strengthen its already superior morale.

As a military case-book, Captain Wintringham's Spanish war memoirs may usefully be read in conjunction with General Duval's *Leçons de la Guerre d'Espagne*; as a personal record of active experience, its counterpart from the opposite lines is available only in the all-too-short pair of articles contributed by Peter Kemp, Lieutenant of the Legion, to *The Times*.

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UNION NOW. By Clarence K. Streit. *Cape.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by AYLMER VALLANCE

THE author of this challenging and, up to a point, persuasive book displays an unusual and intriguing blend of realism and idealism. Surveying the post-war history of international relations, he is driven to the conclusion that the democracies have failed, and look like failing in future, to build an effective resistance against the challenge of tightly organised totalitarian states, swift in action and recognising no law save their own interests. He analyses with insight the gradual disintegration of the League and the weakness inherent in present efforts to revive it, in truncated form, as a "peace front" erected against potential aggression. The League system, he holds, perished as a result of disunity among its members; and the prime cause of that disunity was the refusal of States to surrender one iota of their national sovereignty. The same egocentric nationalism, he fears, will sap the strength of any "Peace Alliance," even if the allied resources are sufficient on paper to render the chances of hostile aggression remote. In these circumstances, what is the solution? Nothing less, argues Mr. Streit, than a Federal Union of the Democratic Powers on both sides of the Atlantic, the creation of a super-State embracing the British Commonwealth, Switzerland, the Low Countries, Scandinavia and the U.S.A.

It is a magnificent project, advocated by its author with skill and conviction. Mr. Streit has no difficulty in demonstrating the great gains which will accrue economically from his Union, and the ability of a Peace Front thus integrated to make its rule effective. The draft constitution which he submits for his super-State is a workmanlike affair, and he meets fairly the various difficulties which critics of his scheme will be inclined to adduce. If man was a completely reasonable being, the union which he envisages would be a practicable proposition. Alas! Man is so much less reasonable than Mr. Streit, and national pride, suspicions and jealousies are so strong that much water—mixed, it may be, with blood—will probably have to flow beneath the bridges before the democratic nations will consent to merge their identities in a vast union stretching eastwards from San Francisco to Finland. The project is magnificent, but still Utopian.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

TRADE, TOTALITARIAN AND OTHERWISE

by "RAPIER"

As I write there is a temporary relaxation in international tension though with the problem of Danzig, not to speak of other problems, still unsolved, confidence is naturally slow to return. Meanwhile diplomatic activity is intense throughout the Chancelleries of Europe and is not confined to political pacts, but is also active in the economic sphere. It is essential for the Dictator countries, who have but small reserves of gold or foreign exchange, to increase, or at least maintain, their export trade in order to ensure supplies of the necessary raw materials to keep up the level of their armament production. Neither Germany nor Italy has, however, been able to maintain its exports and this has forced them to cut down consumption of such imports as coffee, meat, and fats in order that raw materials for industry may be forthcoming. It is, too, the reason for Germany's trade drive in the Balkans, especially Rumania, and for Italy's wooing of Jugoslavia.

At first sight it appeared that Germany by its trade treaty had obtained complete economic control of Rumania, but apparently the treaty was only a skeleton and, before the bare bones were clothed with flesh, it was possible for other countries to step in with alternative schemes. This Britain has done, though on a comparatively small scale, in the Anglo-Rumanian trade pact signed on May 11th. Under this agreement an initial credit of £5,000,000 is provided by the Export Credit Guarantee Fund for the purchase of British goods by Rumania. This credit will be mainly spent in placing armament orders in Britain but will also include purchases of cotton yarn.

On the British side we have agreed to take 200,000 tons of Rumanian wheat from this year's crop if it can be bought at world prices. In addition the Mining Laws are to be revised to allow foreign oil companies to develop new oilfields, which they have been loath to do under the onerous terms of the old mining laws. This is at any rate a beginning and will allow Rumania to carry on a certain amount of foreign trade in a free currency instead of being compelled to confine itself to deals in blocked currency.

The British mission, under Sir Frederick Leith Ross, has gone on to Athens to try to reach a similar agreement with Greece.

The effects of the tour of the Northern European capitals by Mr. Hudson, Secretary of the Overseas Trade Department, are also beginning to bear fruit. Already a Finnish trade mission has visited London, and a Swedish mission is due to arrive on July 3rd. No date has yet been fixed for a Russian delegation but this will no doubt follow the conclusion of the political negotiations with

that country. The political pact with Turkey should also strengthen the trade pact already made with that country so that the British Government's commercial drive is well under way. Throughout these negotiations it has, however, been made clear that the British trade agreements are not in any way intended to exclude other countries from their proper share of trade with the countries involved. Nor is Britain unwilling to increase its trade with Germany. Mr. Chamberlain has announced that when the time appears propitious Britain is willing to re-open the Anglo-German trade negotiations which were suspended when Hitler marched into Prague, an action which so offended public opinion in Britain that the continuation of negotiations at that juncture was impracticable.

Sounding General Franco

There have been reports that a banking syndicate is considering offering a credit of £20,000,000 to General Franco for the reconstruction of Spain. But, however important it is to set Spain on its feet again, it is impossible to contemplate the British or French Treasuries' allowing any of their banks to participate in such a credit until the last Italian and German soldiers have left Spain and until General Franco has more clearly defined his political attitude to France and Britain. It is understood, however, that M. Van Zeeland, the banker ex-premier of Belgium, is going to Spain to survey the ground on behalf of a Dutch and Swiss banking consortium. By the time his report is available the political situation should be clearer and it will be seen whether Spain is likely to retain its independence or to become a satellite to the Rome-Berlin Axis.

Another interesting trade development this month is the opening of negotiations between the United States and Britain for a barter exchange of cotton and wheat for tin and rubber.

This scheme does not mean that Senator Cordell Hull, the strongest proponent among statesmen of the doctrine of free trade, has abandoned his principles. Its intention is merely to build up war stocks of these commodities under Government control in the countries concerned. It must be admitted, however, that the initiative came from America where the Government is somewhat embarrassed in disposing of 11,000,000 bales of cotton which it controls under its loan scheme to farmers. But at the most the British Government could not take more than one year's supply for the Lancashire cotton industry, or about one million bales, and it is improbable that it will take more than half this amount. If any wheat is taken by Britain it will be a still smaller proportion as there is the further complication here that British Empire supplies from Canada and Australia would be affected, and also those from Argentina. These countries would not be slow to protest if their interests were threatened and the British Government is unlikely to stir up a hornet's nest of this kind. It is therefore probable that any barter agreement reached will be confined to about 500,000 bales of American cotton against about 40,000 tons of rubber and 15,000 tons of tin. Nor can British producers alone expect to benefit by the increased releases of rubber and tin, for both these commodities are regulated by international controls in which the Dutch participate equally with Britain, and other countries are also involved to a smaller extent. It is presumed that the extra releases of rubber and tin will be effected by an increase in export quotas permitted by the international controls. Purely as a war measure such a scheme has advantages, but barter at the best is a clumsy method of trade.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: APRIL 16—MAY 16

THE ANTI-AGGRESSION FRONT

GREAT BRITAIN'S acceptance of definite obligations to Eastern European States was followed (April 26th) by her government's decision to adopt the principle of conscription. This step impressed world opinion and dispelled many doubts as to whether the British guarantees could, in fact, be implemented. Nevertheless, the discussions with Russia made disappointingly slow progress. The British Government had suggested, as an immediate measure, that Russia should make a declaration similar to its own, in accordance with the principle, stated by M. Stalin (March 10th), of assisting victims of aggression in fighting for their independence, and that she should agree to aid France and Great Britain should their guarantees involve them in war; these proposals were later re-worded to allow of the Russian intervention being made contingent upon that of France and England. Russia, for her part, desired a wider and less flexible system, viz.: a Three-Power Alliance between herself, France and Great Britain which would jointly guarantee their European neighbours, a method which Great Britain feared might create difficulties by identifying France and herself with the Soviet ideological standpoint. The sudden dismissal of M. Litvinoff (May 3rd), who in western eyes personified Russia's interest in collective security, aroused natural fears as to the future of the discussions.

The Axis Press had sharply denounced these consultations as schemes for "encirclement." Repudiating any such aims Lord Halifax defined British policy (April 19th) as seeking a "comprehensive system against aggression, with facilities for peaceful change."

The French and British Ambassadors were instructed to return to Berlin (April 24th) but Herr von Ribbentrop was "too busy" to receive them in person before Herr Hitler spoke in the Reichstag (April 28th). In this speech, which was relatively mild in tone towards France and Great Britain, the Führer terminated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, alleging that British policy regarded war with Germany as certain, and the German-Polish ten-year non-aggression pact of 1934 on the ground that the recent Anglo-Polish pledges of mutual aid had violated its basis; in both cases he offered to negotiate fresh agreements. In regard to Poland he said that when proposing (about March 22nd) the return of Danzig to the Reich and an extra-territorial road across the Corridor he had offered—for once only—to recognise the present frontiers, to pledge non-aggression for 25 years, and to associate Poland with Hungary and the Reich in the protection of Slovakia; yet Poland, encouraged by British promises, had refused to negotiate. Replying in the same speech to President Roosevelt's telegram of April 15th, Herr Hitler protested the peacefulness of his policy, which had achieved so much without resort to war, only incorporating districts that were historical German territory; he asked derisively which were the states threatened, since all that he had questioned had replied negatively; though declining to give any general guarantee, he offered to sign non-aggression pacts with states that made "appropriate proposals."

Colonel Beck, replying in a speech and memorandum on May 5th, denied that offers concerning a 25-year pledge and a condominium over Slovakia had been formally made, though there had been allusions to wider schemes (apparently a partition of Russian territory). He showed that Germany herself had not felt debarred by the Pact of 1934 from signing agreements with other states so that no ground existed for terminating the Pact, and he maintained that his own

counter-proposals of March 26th to the German demands, suddenly put forward after the occupation of Prague, concerning Danzig and transit facilities through Pomorze (the Corridor), where Poland would not abate her sovereignty, were not a refusal to negotiate. Regarding Danzig he asked if Germany's aim was the liberation of the citizens—whose freedom was not threatened—or to bar Poland from the Baltic "from which she will not be barred." Poland, he said, was ready for negotiations so long as their aims and methods were peaceable. In Poland it was felt that the next step now lay with the Reich; the latter held a contrary view. In France, where M. Daladier had declared (May 4th) that French security was linked to the question of domination or co-operation in Europe, it was recognised that the issue of Danzig was wider than at first appeared, involving as it did the independent existence of Poland. In Rome, where this fact was also admitted, the semi-official Press hinted that Italy was best fitted to mediate. Meanwhile, a German Press campaign charging Poland with terrorising her German and Ukrainian minorities, combined with the establishment of camps for the fugitives near the Polish border, recalled the methods in use during the Sudeten crisis in 1938.

Other reactions to the British anti-aggression policy were the conversations (April 29th) in Rome between the Italian General Staff and the German commander-in-chief, General von Brauchitsch, who was then shown the Italian military preparations in Tripoli and near the Egyptian frontier (May 3rd). These preparations, it may be noted, had led the Egyptian premier to declare (April 24th) that Egypt was ready to defend herself and was assured of Great Britain's full support, a statement confirmed by Mr. Chamberlain in Parliament on May 1st. Marshal Göring returned quietly to San Remo (May 4th). After a meeting between Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano at Milan (May 6th-7th) it was announced that the Reich and Italy had agreed to define their relations formally in a military and political pact by which, as Italian commentators explained, the partners recognised each other's spheres—the whole Mediterranean for Italy; the Baltic and South-east Europe for the Reich—within which each would pursue its aims, facilitating yet not engaging to support, the plans of each other. This alliance was represented in Germany as a counter-stroke to British "encirclement," and as spelling *finis* to rumours of an impending dislocation of the Axis.

Suggestions of mediation by the Pope which were rumoured as having been made (May 9th) to the five Powers in their disputes, including that between Poland and Germany, were coldly received by the Axis. The German propaganda organs now spoke more threateningly, depicting the British and French guarantees to Poland as insincere gestures. In a speech on May 11th Mr. Chamberlain said that an attempt to settle the Danzig question by force would "start a conflagration" in which England would be involved and referred to the deadly mistake of thinking that France and Great Britain would not fulfil their pledges. On the same day M. Daladier, in a resolute speech enthusiastically acclaimed by the Chamber, declared that France was far from being worn down by the new form of "war without battle," and that if peace were infringed the weight of her arms would be felt.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS

The Anglo-Russian negotiations were destined to encounter further delays. British proposals covering the specific cases of aggression against Poland and Rumania were delivered to the Kremlin (May 8th); a statement published to the world in Moscow next day showed that M. Stalin's objection to them was that they required Russia, in the above-mentioned cases, to assist France and England, but did not contemplate guarantees to the Baltic states or assistance to Russia if she had to defend them. Mr. Chamberlain declared (May

10th) that there was a misunderstanding, but the *Izvestia* (May 12th) maintained the Russian objections and insisted that a mutual aid pact including France, England, Russia and, if possible, Poland was essential to bar further aggression. In order that the matter might be discussed between Lord Halifax and M. Potemkin at Geneva the League Council meeting was postponed till May 22nd; but on May 16th it was announced that M. Potemkin would not be going to Geneva at all, M. Maisky taking his place.

ANGLO-TURKISH PACT

The Anglo-Turkish negotiations proved less complex. Turkey had become convinced, as was revealed by her statesmen in a parliamentary debate (May 12th) that, in view of the Nazi plans for expansion eastward and the Italian preparations in the islands off her coast, she could no longer pursue a policy of neutrality. An agreement, signed on May 12th, and approved by the National Assembly the same day, provided for the subsequent conclusion of a long-term Anglo-Turkish security pact; meanwhile, the parties agreed that, in case of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean region—a term including the Black Sea—they would afford each other every possible aid. They would also continue their consultations for the establishment of security in the Balkans. In the French Chamber M. Daladier indicated (May 11th) that the Franco-Turkish negotiations (which cover the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey) would shortly result in a similar agreement for security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

HUNGARY, THE AXIS AND THE BALKANS

Count Teleki, the Hungarian Premier, visited Rome (April 18th) and Berlin (May 1st). On his return from Germany his Press declared that Hungary would stand by her mighty neighbours "in all circumstances." It was however intimated, to allay public uneasiness, that no fresh engagement had been assumed. Dr. Markovitch, Jugoslav Foreign Minister, had conversations with Count Ciano at Venice (April 23rd) and promised "faithful collaboration"—a phrase interpreted in Berlin as excluding acceptance of a British guarantee. He was then summoned to visit Herr Hitler (April 26th), but appears to have resisted all efforts to bring Jugoslavia into the orbit of the Axis. M. Gafencu, Rumanian foreign minister, visited Berlin (April 26th), having assured Col. Beck *en route* of his government's loyalty to the Polish alliance. In his conversation in London (April 23rd-26th) and in Paris (April 30th) he emphasised Rumania's desire to avoid giving provocation to Germany and her reluctance to admit Russian troops to her territory.

The Bulgarian premier declared (April 20th) that his country must remain aloof from the Balkan Entente till its aspirations (the Southern Dobruja and an outlet on the Aegean) were satisfied. In spite of the desirability of a common Balkan front, General Metaxas, for Greece (April 24th), and M. Calinescu, for Rumania (May 1st), re-affirmed their inflexible opposition to territorial concessions. The Russian deputy foreign commissar, M. Potemkin, concluded negotiations, which he described as "highly satisfactory," at Ankara (April 29th-May 6th), and on his way back to Moscow passed through Sofia (where he noted the strength of Pan-Slav sentiment) Bucharest, and Warsaw. Polish opinion, gratified by news of the appointment of a Russian ambassador in Warsaw, welcomed the visit, though still averse to a mutual aid pact with Russia.

In Bucharest, after three weeks' negotiations, Sir Leith Ross's Trade Mission signed an agreement (May 11th), based on a British credit of £5,000,000, which, by rendering Rumania less dependent on the German market, dispelled the fears of economic domination arising from her treaty with the Reich on March 23rd. The British Mission arrived in Athens on May 13th for discussions with Greece.

THE BALTIC

After the offer made in Herr Hitler's Reichstag speech (see above) the "Northern" states (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) were informally invited (May 2nd) to conclude non-aggression pacts with the Reich, whose assent to the fortification of the Aland Islands (announced on the same day) was said to be conditional on a pledge of neutrality by Finland and Sweden in any conflict involving the Baltic. The four foreign ministers met in Stockholm (May 9th) and reported to their governments that assurances of respect for their independence would be welcome from any quarter and that a corresponding attitude on their part would follow naturally from the neutrality policy which their states had already adopted. It was, however, recognised that an identical answer might be difficult for Denmark, as a neighbour of Germany.

The Latvian and Estonian Governments, to whom similar overtures had been made, agreed, after a conference at Tallinn (May 7th), to sign non-aggression pacts with the Reich. Latvia, as her foreign minister disclosed (May 13th), had already been assured by the Soviet Government of its interest in her independence.

SPAIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Spanish Government continued to press France for the return of treasure and materials, in execution of the Bérard-Jordana Agreement. The presence of a fleet of 25 German warships at Tangier and in southern Spanish ports, together with reported troop movements in Andalusia, led to British reinforcements being sent to Gibraltar, which was equipped to stand a siege. The "victory parade," after which General Franco had promised that all foreign troops would be withdrawn was again postponed till May 19th. The Spanish Government gave notice (May 4th) of its intention to withdraw from the League, which its press accused of being an organ of Bolshevism.

THE FAR EAST

Cabinet discussions at Tokio at the end of April concerning Germany's overtures for the conversion of the anti-Comintern Pact into an alliance seem to have shown that, except in army, as distinct from naval and industrial, circles, the weight of opinion was against any such commitments outside the Far East. The Japanese ambassador in America stated (April 27th) that the anti-Comintern Pact was not aimed at the democracies. On the conclusion of the German-Italian alliance (May 7th), the War Minister did indeed say, informally, that Japan "might possibly" join it and M. Arita observed (May 8th) that Japan could not remain indifferent to an Anglo-Russian agreement, even if not applicable in the Far East.

The Tokio Foreign Office made a demand to the American and British Ambassadors (May 3rd) for a reorganisation of the Shanghai Municipal Council, giving Japan a larger influence.

In addition to guerilla raiding, larger Chinese offensives were directed towards Kaifeng, Hankow, Nanchang and Canton. About May 12th the Japanese claimed to have repelled all these attacks and to have trapped and destroyed the Chinese army operating east of the Han Valley. Frequent Japanese air raids against cities destroyed vast stores of supplies and disorganised national life. At Chungking (May 4th) the casualties numbered some thousands. Nevertheless, the Chinese will to resist was maintained, in spite of some defeatism in the occupied zones, where trade was at a standstill. General Chiang Kai-shek declared (April 18th) that peace was impossible till Japan abandoned her offensive policy, and (April 30th) that the real Chinese offensive had not yet begun. Meanwhile he continued to develop culture and industries in the backward western provinces with the aid of refugee technicians from the east, and to build up an air force with Soviet and American planes at centres in Yunnan and Chinese Turkestan.

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Late Supplement to WORLD REVIEW, July, 1939

FOREIGN BALANCES

by

DOUGLAS REED

The Russian Alliance

About a year ago I began to write this monthly summary of foreign affairs. It was intended to give a picture of the development of the international situation in the preceding month, of the ebb and flow of foreign opinion, of the improvement or deterioration of Britain's position in the world.

For the past four months this monthly totting-up of the balance has become meaningless, because the whole business of the concern, "Foreign Affairs," has been at a standstill, waiting on the conclusion or non-conclusion of a deal which means prosperity or bankruptcy—the Russian Alliance.

No longer does it matter whether the small State of Poldavia has moved nearer to the Axis or whether Oblivia tends to smile upon the advances of Britain and France. That time is past. The decisive, the master move now impends, and who wins or loses the Red King wins or loses the game.

For more than three months the hands have hovered over that piece—and still we do not know our fate.

In March I was in Prague watching Hitler's invasion. In April I was in a West Country inn, where British seamen drank to the victory over the Armada, thinking, "By this time next month, surely we shall know if England has come to her senses, awakened to her danger, at last." In May I was in London, thinking the same thing. In June, after a road smash, I am on my back, worrying part of the time about the sight of one eye, but for the rest of the time thinking the same thing.

Nemesis

Now, unless the next few days, against all the portents, bring that arrangement with Russia, there is no longer any room for hope or doubt. Our rulers do not want and do not mean to have that anti-aggression front, which can only be built

on the triangular foundation stone of Britain-France-Russia, and we are to be delivered to our enemy. That is the inescapable alternative. The development which began in Manchuria and Abyssinia has at last reached our shores, and—unless at the eleventh hour our rulers think better of it—we shall pay the bill in the humiliation of Britain, the loss of British territory, the loss of our liberty and inviolacy from invasion.

These are the dangers always clear in the distance from the day that the "Placate Germany" group in England came to power, that now loom imminently over us.

Public Inertia

To me, the contrast between these imminent perils and the muddle-headedness of England, studied at close quarters for the first time in 12 years, is the most depressing thing of this fateful summer. There is an awful likeness between the parish-pump outlook, the obstinate unawareness, and the impenetrable inertia of the England I have returned to, and the state of mind in Austria before the deluge.

The majority of the people I talk to seem intuitively to feel, though they neither realise nor understand why, that we are in a very precarious position and that we need Russia. "Of course, we must have the alliance with Russia," they say, "little though we like Russian domestic politics."

But they are misled from day to day by a press, supposedly "free," which in venality and unscrupulousness outdoes that of the totalitarian countries.

Dishonest Bluff

A dozen times this press has told the public that the alliance with Russia was on the verge of conclusion. It was untrue. The truth is that the Russians, three-and-a-half months ago, stated minimum conditions for an alliance, that they have not budged an inch from them since, that the British Government has consistently refused to accept them and that all the drivel in the Press about "negotiations," "a hitch in the negotiations," "progress in the negotiations" and the like has been a dishonest bluff, designed to delude the British public into believing that a real effort to form an anti-agression front was being made.

Our Prime Ministers

Indeed, unless the next few days bring reassurance, it now seems clear beyond doubt that another of the dear old three-card tricks, which always end in a serious deterioration of Britain's position in the world, is being played on the British public. Ramsay Macdonald smashed the Opposition for a decade or more and formed a National Government in order to keep Britain on the gold standard—and a few days later Britain went off the gold standard. Honest Baldwin—the living proof that honesty is the worst policy—led Britain and the world against Italy in an election fought on the Abyssinian issue—and as soon as the election was won Abyssinia was abandoned. Neville Chamberlain reaped the

affectionate cheers of Englishmen for the loyal British guarantee he gave dismembered Czecho-Slovakia at Munich in September, 1938, and in March, 1939, he duly deplored the annexation of that British-guaranteed rump, but that was all.

Humiliations to Come

Now the same old trick is to be played again. The anxiety of the British public, awakened by the invasion of Bohemia, is to be stilled by a pretence of "negotiations" with Russia; then they will be dropped, and the British public told that the Russians are hopeless; then the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich, the partitioning of Poland, the surrender of colonies, should follow fairly quickly. But those would not be the last, though they would probably be the least, of the humiliations inflicted on Britain by a Germany which had stepped in and secured Russian benevolent neutrality.

Our Ignorant Rulers

That is what will happen unless the rulers of England abandon their ignorant obsessions about foreign tactics—and why should they abandon them? As yet, they have stuck to them through thick and thin. It is astounding how, under their leadership the international situation precisely follows a course foreseeable—and foreseen—long in advance. Still, Britain's foreign policy is made by men who have no personal knowledge of foreign countries, peoples, tongues or politics—Mr. Chamberlain, his "Chief Economic Adviser," the co-architect of Munich, Sir Horace Wilson, the Editor of *The Times*, and, in the background, the Stonewaller-in-Chief, Mr. Butler.

And Britain, looking on bemused and befuddled, seems either to have lost the instinct of self-preservation or the sense of right and wrong.

Rock-a-Bye-Baby

The statements with which the British baby, on its precarious tree-top, is lulled to sleep in this perilous hour are sometimes hair-raising. A good instance is the Prime Minister's declaration, on June 24th, that Britain has "the greatest Navy and Air Force in the world." That the second half of this statement should be made, by the head of the Government, is incredible; but then did not honest Baldwin in November, 1934, say, that in a year's time Britain would still be half as strong again as Germany in the air?

Stalin's British Bluntness

There are no "negotiations" with Russia. There is a Russian offer, an immutable one, which was made nearly four months ago, and which our rulers have been walking round, like a terrier round a mongoose, ever since. As somebody has said, Russia has on this occasion behaved with British bluntness and straightforwardness, and Britain has countered with almost oriental procrastination and evasiveness.

But if we do not sign up with Russia, Hitler will, and the result will be those which I have described earlier in this article.

5

The Alleged Difficulty

I forgot to mention what the point of difference is—allegedly—between ourselves and Russia. Originally we wished Russia to guarantee those States, lying between her and Germany, which we, meaninglessly, had guaranteed against aggression after the invasion of Bohemia. Russia pointed out that certain other States—the Baltic States—lay between her and Germany; what if Germany attacked her through them? Either a guarantee for all or for none; if we wished her to undertake to help us in making good a guarantee, we must help her if she were threatened from some other quarter.

On that, our rulers have for nearly four months refused to bite, and every day that has passed has increased the Russian suspicion that what they really want is precisely that Germany *should* attack Russia through that non-guaranteed gap. Among the ingenious excuses that have been made—by the dictators to Prague of Munich!—is that Esthonia does not want a Russian guarantee.

Parallel with Belgium

In truth, the case is an exact parallel with that of Belgium. Britain considers it vital to her safety that Germany should not occupy Belgium, and would go to war to prevent that, whether or not the Germans found some Belgian stool-pigeon to invite Hitler to come in and protect gallant little Belgium from the Bolshevist danger, from Britain, or what-not.

That is exactly the position of the Baltic States in relation to Russia.

Now we have the choice. Or rather, we have not. In three months in England I have discovered that public opinion in this country is just as impotent as in any dictatorship state. Our fate is in the hands of a little group of men representating the inherited dividend class. Soon, we shall know what they are going to do with us and our country.

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CONTENTS

		PAGE
A MINISTRY OF INFORMATION	*Vernon Bartlett*	5
ITALY UNDER HITLER	*Cartoons*	12
NEW SPIRIT IN THE ARMY	*Major B. T. Reynolds* ..	13
THE COLONIAL PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED	*Dr. L. Haden Guest, M.P.* ..	19
PACT DIFFICULTIES	*Cartoons*	24
THE FAR-EASTERN OFFENSIVE		
WAR IN THE BALANCE	*"Kobe Shimbun"*	25
WHERE WAR SUPPLIES COME FROM	*Freda Utley, "Far Eastern Service," London* ..	26
WEAK SPOTS AT SINGAPORE	*Rupert Lockwood, "Austral-Asiatic Bulletin," Melbourne*	27
ANTI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA	*"North-China Herald," Shanghai*	32
THE SEEDS OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY	*"China at War," Chungking* ..	34
EUROPE, JULY 1939 EDITION	*Map*	38
STALIN STANDS FIRM		
BALTIC DILEMMA	*Pierre Dominique, "La République," Paris* ..	39
SCANDINAVIAN TREASURY	*Lucien Romier, "Figaro," Paris*	42
LESSER OF TWO EVILS	*Pertinax, "L'Ordre," Paris* ..	45
DIARY OF A PACT	*Jules River, "Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris* ..	46
THESE ARE POLAND'S RIGHTS IN DANZIG	*Polish Bulletin of Information, Washington*	49